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Bolivia 1980-1981: the Political System in Crisis 
There can be little doubt that the Bolivian political system is in 
deep crisis. Over the last four years the country has witnessed no 
less than three elections, ten presidents and eight coups (both failed 
and successful). What is noteworthy, indeed remarkable, about this 
chaos is that it has continued through two periods of highly distinct 
and polarised forms of government: the 'democratic experiment1 of 
1978 to July 1980 and the military regimes born of the harsh coup of 
17 July 1980. For some months after the coup commentators sought 
explanations of the failure to establish a stable civil regime in the 
extreme weakness of the country's parliamentary tradition, the inepti-
tude of the civilian political elite and the historical tendency of 
the armed forces to take direct control in periods when they possess 
the institutional capacity so to do. The radicalism of the coup, the 
clear intention of its leaders to emulate the examples of Chile (1973), 
Uruguay (1973) and Argentina (1976), and the manifest failure of the 
large political formations to win an unambiguous popular mandate for 
their parliamentary project were all construed as constituting a de-
cisive end of an era. 
However, by early 1981 it was increasingly clear that the military 
had signally failed to consolidate its pinochetazo. By the middle 
of the year it was engaged in internecine conflicts that promised to 
wreck institutional unity; having sought to put an end to a period of 
political confusion, the armed forces were presiding over one that was 
no less turbulent and in many respects a great deal more injurious 
to its interests. Explanations for this - the ascendance of the 
cocaine trade and the resulting corrosion of accepted channels of 
power; the continued hostility of the U.S.; the severity of the 
economic crisis - certainly indicated that the post-July 1980 crisis 
was of a distinct form compared with that of the preceding two years. 
However, it is also apparent that while the Garcia Meza coup altered 
the form of the emergency, it did not institute it. Many of the 
factors that destabilised the parliamentary period - sectoral divi-
sions in the ruling class (both civilian and military); substantial 
economic difficulties; regional interests; a failure to gain un-
disputed control of the working class and peasantry - have persisted. 
In order both to give this view some substance and to provide some of 
the essential background to the coup this essay begins with a depiction 
of the period 1978 to July 1980. By virtue of the relative openness 
of political life this was a period of extraordinary richness in 
party activity and social developments, many of which are only touched 
on or omitted altogether here, for an exhaustive analytical account 
is out of the scope of this paper. Similarly, my aim in surveying 
the subsequent military regime goes no further than to depict its 
principal characteristics in very summary form since at the time of 
writing (May 1982) the crisis still persists and we are too close to 
many events to judge their weight and consequences with great confi-
dence. Given the necessary limitations on space, I have attempted 
to relieve the text of some of the burden of narrative by including 
a select chronology at the end of the essay. 
'The Democratic Experiment': 1978 to July 1980 
In one sense it is possible to locate the origins of the present 
crisis in a single act: the decision in December 1977 of the wives 
of four miners gaoled for political activity to go on hunger strike 
in demand for their husbands1 release, the granting of a full poli-
tical amnesty, and the acceleration of the 'apertura' recently 
announced by the government of General Hugo Banzer. The strike 
achieved such rapid popular backing that within a fortnight it had 
effectively broken the political momentum of a regime that was the 
most secure and well organised in modern Bolivian history. 
Banzer had come to power in August 1971 after the decisive 
defeat of the working class and had been able to consolidate his 
government through the rise in oil prices and had a short but em-
phatic boom in the agro-industrial economy of the eastern capital of 
Santa Cruz, which still remains his power-base. However, by 1977 
not only was his regime badly riven by the corruption and internal 
dissent that might be expected after six years of dictatorship in 
which political favours were the monopoly of a very limited group, 
but it was also increasingly weakened by the consequences of raising 
large foreign loans on decreasingly favourable terms. This, combined 
with pressure from the Carter administration for a relaxation of 
control, contributed to the decision to adopt a measured retreat in 
the face of the demands of the outlawed political parties and the 
recuperating labour movement. To these factors should be added the 
pressures from an important sector of the armed forces which, while 
by no means agreed upon a clear political project to replace the 
banzerato, sought a revision of the terms of military control with 
the prime objective of diminishing its unpopularity and vulnerability 
to internal division as well as reversing the extended hegemony of 
Banzerfs personal following within the institution. 
Banzer1s capitulation of the majority of the demands of the hunger 
strikers in January 1978 was intended to pave the way for the re-
alignment of his regime without conceding substantial ground to the 
large populist political formations derived from the MNR, the party 
that led the 1952 revolution and continued to dominate political life 
outside the military. This Banzer failed to do, in part because 
the demands for full democratic rights contained in the hunger strike 
- from its start under the direction of the miners' union (FSTMB) -
led to an impressive wave of unionisation in almost every sector, 
including the campesinos, marking an unexpected strengthening of a 
labour movement that as recently as 1976 had been reduced to a state 
of almost complete disintegration by repression. This revival of 
the working class channelled into a much broader movement headed by 
the returning reformist politicians, who sought elections and the 
establishment of a formal bourgeois democracy, an objective that was 
not challenged by the majority of the parties of the left. 
Over the following two years the endeavour to give substance to 
such a system - which Bolivia had never before experienced in a 
meaningful manner - led to a succession of crises, antagonising the 
expectant working class, progressively exhausted with the indecision 
and ineffectiveness of the constitutionalist camp, and the military, 
increasingly worried by the independence of the labour movement and 
the incapacity of the civilian political leadership to curb it. 
The resulting political instability produced three elections, six 
presidents, three successful coups and twice as many abortive 
rebellions. 
This failure of both nerve and direction was, however, by no 
means limited to the civilian political elite seeking a genuine and 
lasting 'apertura'. Indeed, it was initiated by the remarkable 
ineptitude of Banzer's efforts to assure a placid continuismo by 
backing his ex-minister of the interior, airforce General Juan Pereda, 
as the official candidate in the hastily-organised elections of 
July 1978. Pereda, far more of an acolyte than a successor, was 
confronted by two main oppositional coalitions: the Union Democra-
tica Popular (UDP), headed by the MNR-Izquierda of Hernan Siles 
Zuazo (president, 1956-60), and the MNR-Historico/Autentico, led by 
Victor Paz Estenssoro (president, 1952-56, 1960-64). Of these two 
forces, the UDP had the marginally greater popular following largely 
as a result of its social democratic credentials - fortified by the 
presence of the radical MIR and further consolidated by the pro-
Moscow PCB - as well as the poor reputation acquired by Paz as a 
result of his support for Banzer up to 1974, an alliance that off-set 
the advantages gained from his association with many of the post-1952 
reforms. 
Unaccustomed to the procedures of combating an open political 
challenge without resort to force, Banzer duly countered the rising 
popularity of the reformist opposition by organising (or, at the very 
least, acquiescing in) a massive and open fraud in the 1978 poll. 
This had the effect of disorientating the right for although the UDP 
steadfastly desisted from any act other than verbally proclaiming 
its victory, the balance of forces momentarily placed Washington 
in league with the UDP and made it impossible for Pereda's nominal 
triumph to be imposed as if nothing untoward had occurred. 
This drove a wedge between Banzer and Pereda, who as the natural 
heir possessed the backing of Santa Cruz and many of the former 
servants of the banzerato. Each laid responsibility for the impasse 
on the other; when Banzer attempted to break out of it by tacitly 
admitting the fraud and declaring his intention of handing power 
over to a military junta Pereda responded by rebelling in Santa Cruz 
and, after several days of tense negotiation and a complete split 
in the armed forces, ousting Banzer from La Paz. The apparent loss 
to Banzer of his constituency in Santa Cruz suggested that even if 
the seven-year dictatorship was to be refined and extended, its 
figurehead had been eclipsed. This was soon to be revealed to be 
far from the case; not only did Pereda need to mend the fences with 
his old patron in order to hold together the critical military-
peasant pact but Banzer also proved capable of readjusting in a re-
markably short space of time to the new rules of political com-
petition by building his own party (ADN) and retrieving his hold 
over the right within the parliamentary orbit (still in abeyance under 
Pereda) as well as maintaining close links with the military. 
This success was made even more pronounced by the unworkable 
position in which Pereda found himself insofar as he had staged a 
coup 'against1 a fraud that was in his favour. As a result, he was 
obliged to present himself only as an 'interim' president, and 
announced that new elections would take place in 1980, ruling out a 
poll in 1979 because of the dangers of political competition during 
the hundredth anniversary of the War of the Pacific. 
However transparent this manoeuvre, Pereda might well have been 
able to bring it off had he been more disposed to exercise the kind 
of repression frequently employed by Banzer. His failure to do this 
corresponded not only to a remarkable political incompetence and the 
self-proclaimed limit to his term of office but also the consequent 
lack of concerted support from the cruceno oligarchy and Washington 
as well as the deep-seated divisions within the military over the 
acceptability of braking the 'apertura' at such an early stage. 
These doubts were bolstered by a widespread conviction that Pereda 
lacked the resolution to succeed Banzer, whom he had deposed but to 
whom he still remained beholden. Moreover, the new president showed 
no intention of proceeding to resolve the increasingly open and cri-
tical institutional disputes that derived from a division between 
those officers who graduated before the 1952 revolution and occupied 
senior posts, and those men, many now senior colonels awaiting 
positions of authority, who had been trained under the MNR and 
generally possessed more profound desarrollista and statist ideas 
but had not flourished under Banzer. The most coherent group of 
this fluid stratum were known as the institucionalistas or Karachi-
pampas , after the garrison in which many of their adepts had served. 
It was this group of reformist-minded career officers and not 
disenchanted forces on the right that removed Pereda after only four 
months in order to guarantee a carefully-controlled but authentic 
transfer of power to civilians. The November 1978 coup of the 
Karachipampas was, unsurprisingly, widely applauded by the principal 
centrist parties which had proved incapable of active opposition 
themselves and were seeking a military alliance that would shield 
them from the restitution of the dictatorship. The fulsome support 
they lent the institucionalistas betokened a dependence that was 
to become ever more acute over the following months, signalling a 
predictable weakness of constitutionalism. (The degree to which 
this was the case may be seen in the fact that the MIR, a party 
that possessed deep radical and anti-militarist origins, was by 
mid-1981 calling for a military government in spite of the experience 
of the intervening years). 
The colonels invited General David Padilla to serve as president 
until new elections, now called for June 1979. Padilla was a 
respected and capable career officer without close political affilia-
tions although like many of his backers he showed a proclivity for 
Pazfs MNR, which was the party favoured by Washington. The Padilla 
regime was a holding operation and in many senses the most consoli-
dated administration of the entire period 1978 to 1982. This was 
in large part due to its trenchantly military character and limited 
objectives; it sought only to maintain 'public o^der1 and oversee 
the preparations for and holding of another poll. 
Strong measures were taken against a number of efforts by the 
extreme right (principally the FSB/Falange) to destabilise this 
process and Banzer was summarily retired from the army and fired 
as ambassador to Buenos Aires. But the troops were not removed 
from the mining areas and no major economic measures taken despite 
growing pressure from the IMF for devaluation and expenditure cuts 
to aid repayment of Bolivia's very large foreign debt. In its 
measured populism, desistence from notable acts of repression, and 
careful negotiation with the COB (the national trade union confede-
ration) the Padilla interregnum was a markedly more prescient 
response to the growing radicalism of the labour movement than the 
inept continuismo of Pereda. Although much of its success may be 
attributed to the fact that it was in almost every respect a 
'honeymoon' regime and short enough to be able to avoid taking 
unpopular measures, the government established Padilla as the leading 
populist figure inside the military. After July 1980 he continued to 
be the generally accepted candidate to lead any 'salida democratizante' 
on the part of the armed forces, a position that acquired unforeseen 
importance as the traditional policies of 'order' and rigid institu-
tional rule proved progressively inoperable. 
The poll of June 1979 differed from that of the previous year 
not simply in that it was conducted in a largely honest manner 
(by Bolivian standards) but also in the configuration of parties 
that contested it. Under Padilla political alignments had the 
opportunity to develop so that the 1979 election presented a much 
fuller spectrum of political forces and gave evidence of a number of 
substantial differences from the previous year's contest between the 
established formations carrying with them a politics formulated in the 
seven years of the banzerato. Perhaps the most notable aspect was 
the entry of Banzer's ADN into the parliamentary arena, providing an 
authentic vehicle for the right, important sections of which drew 
away from the FSB and Paz' MNR towards the fascistoide and techno-
cratic apparat campaigning under the old dictatorial slogan, 'Paz, 
Orden, Trabajo' (a slogan that was itself dropped in 1980, when the 
leadership of the ADN felt it was too fascist in tone and unwarranted 
in view of the party's by then established position in the political 
spectrum). This shift by Banzer, which convinced many centrist 
politicians that the threat of a coup was now greatly diminished, 
was partly caused by and partly compensated for by Paz's attempt to 
construct a broad popular alliance that would challenge the UDP on 
its own terms; this policy led him to join forces with the pro-
Peking and eminently dengxiaopingista PCB-ML. Despite the fact that the 
maoists had been the force on the left to grow most strongly under 
Banzer and for the first time in many years exercised an influence 
at national level both inside and outside the unions, the party put 
its radical credentials at risk by following the muddy path along-
side the 'most advanced sector of the bourgeoisie'. 
Between them, the major constituent parties of the UDP continued 
to hold sway over organised labour but the coalition's leftist image, 
which derived principally from the jacobin origins of the MIR, came 
under strong challenge from the small but increasingly influential 
Partido Socialista-Uno (PS-1) of Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz, the 
minister who had nationalised Gulf Oil in 1969, an orator of con-
siderable prowess, and the accepted leader of the moves to have 
Banzer impeached in Congress for a string of offences committed 
during his rule. The PS-1 was never able to dislodge the UDP's 
hold over the unions but it enjoyed much success in eroding its 
prestige as the 'natural' left alternative amongst the urban middle 
class and the youth, continually arraigning the UDP for empty 
populism, bureaucratic manoeuvring and abdicating a class line. 
In this, the MIR, hitherto the strongest force on the left inside 
the revolutionary caucus of small but traditionally robust Trotskyist 
parties, suffered the most damage. The PS-l's parliamentary radi-
calism also served to stir up much military antagonism to the 
potential activities of Congress, which was set to turn much of its 
attention to a hectoring trial of Banzer that was sure to devolve 
into an indictment of the entire military apparatus under his rule. 
In retrospect it is somewhat remarkable that the parliamentarians 
should undertake this task without any vestige of military support -
- even Padilla was outraged - thereby putting their very existence at 
risk. 
The combination of these developments led to a disastrous impasse 
for the constitutionalist experiment. The first major blow was a 
stalemate in the June elections with the UDP possessing only a mar-
ginal majority in the presidential poll, the MNR with a narrow but 
workable majority in Congress, the ADN representing an unexpectedly 
powerful third force to defend the military's reputation, and the 
PS-1 gaining sufficient seats to ensure the prosecution of the case 
against Banzer. The impasse was further complicated by the parties' 
relish for immersing themselves in the parliamentary game and en-
gaging in frantic in-fighting with neither side prepared to make 
any concessions in the long debates over how to resolve the lack of 
a clear result and form a government. It was only when the military, 
especially the Karachipampas, showed signs of acute impatience that 
a compromise was hurriedly arranged. The final agreement, the 
appointment of Paz's alliance partner Walter Guevara, who occupied 
the position of president of the senate, as interim president with 
a mandate to call further elections in June 1980, conformed to pro-
tocol but soon proved to be highly unsatisfactory. Guevara was 
scarcely blessed with the goodwill of Paz, with whom he had violently 
broken in 1960 and only reached an entente in 1978. Yet, he was 
even more deeply distrusted by the UDP, which viewed him as Paz's 
front-runner and a highly capable broker for the constitutionalist 
right. However, both fronts acquiesced in the appointment because, 
amongst other factors, it enabled them to maintain the privilege 
of opposition and distance themselves from an administration that 
had no popular mandate and was expected to encounter extensive 
popular resistance in a period of rapidly worsening economic con-
ditions . 
The very fact that the electoral process had yet again come to 
a lame halt and required a second interregnum when there was no 
major external impediment to a formation of a government was in 
itself a blow to the constitutionalist camp and accounted for a 
progressive falling away of popular enthusiasm. This was made all 
the more acute by the fact that the temporary resolution lacked 
political authority and was bereft of a firm military alliance, both 
factors that were soon to be critical. 
The leadership of the COB, which had held itself in check for 
15 months, was now forced by rank and file pressure to take an 
initiative on the economic front and presented a programme that 
incorporated extensive wage rises, protectionism, expansion of state 
ownership and wide-ranging fiscal measures for income redistribution. 
This plan received broad support from the HDP which did not itself 
possess a detailed plan of action for the economy although it had 
succeeded in arousing expectations of reflation in its vague state-
ments. This support was not in itself remarkable and did not 
prevent the new government from giving short shrift to the proposals, 
but it underlined the particularly precarious position Guevara was 
in for the economic crisis was now, after two years of minimal 
management, of such an order that some substantial measures would 
have to be taken to placate the IMF. Guevara's own preference was 
for a sharp deflationary package but the social consequences of such 
a move were far too great to be faced by an administration of the 
type he headed. 
Unable to take independent action, the interim president asked 
for the positive support of the major parties. Yet neither the UDP, 
which opposed them anyway, nor the MNR, which could have been expected 
to support them under normal conditions, would give him backing. 
Guevara therefore precipitated a crisis by outlining his options: 
either the economy could be left to deteriorate with unforeseeable 
consequences for the entire constitutionalist current or he could 
reconstruct his caretaker administration to adopt firm measures, but 
this latter alternative would require a longer period than that left 
before the next elections. As a result he suggested a postponement 
of the poll and the formation of a coalition to deal with the crisis. 
His invitation to the ADN to discuss possible involvement in such 
an alliance provided the other parties with an easy excuse to reject 
Guevara's overtures and accuse him of overstepping his powers and 
abusing the confidence of Congress. 
The dangers of this situation, which developed throughout October, 
were not long in becoming manifest; on 11 October the garrison of 
Trinidad (Beni) declared itself in rebellion against the 'weak 
government' of Guevara and called for the formation of a military re-
gime. The leaders of the revolt had clearly been angered by the 
celebrations of the anniversary of the death of Che Guevara and the 
continuing impeachment of Banzer in Congress but their general com-
plaint was now recognised as common amongst officers. However, 
the threat of the coup spreading appeared to have been diverted when 
the president sent Colonel Alberto Natusch, who was from the Beni 
and had a tough reputation as Banzer's minister of agriculture and 
peasant affairs, to negotiate a settlement. Although the highly 
tenuous position of both the presidency and parliament was under-
lined by this incident, it did little to alter the actions of these 
bodie s. The question of the composition of the administration, its 
powers, and the future of the 1980 elections continued to be the 
subject of heated and acrimonious debate until the end of the month. 
The presence of delegates for the OAS meeting in La Paz in the last 
week of October and their overwhelming vote in support of Bolivia's 
claim for an exit to the sea provided a modicum of relief and was 
judged to have improved Guevara's standing, but in fact this only 
concealed continuing polarisation and proved to be a delaying 
factor in the decision of important sectors of the armed forces to 
put an end to the confusion. 
Early on the morning of 1 November, when many OAS delegates were 
still in La Paz, a coup was staged by Natusch himself. Large numbers 
of troops occupied the capital in what was one of the bloodiest and 
most confused events in Bolivian political history, marking a major 
watershed in the 'democratic experiment'. The unrestrained violence 
of the soldiery in confronting popular opposition in the streets 
appeared to herald a movement modelled on those of Chile and Argentina. 
However, the political objectives of Natusch's action were not prin-
cipally derived from these examples although many of the commanders 
(a large number of whom were committed to separate plots overtaken 
by that of Natusch) differed with him in this. Natusch's aim, 
clearly articulated in the first days of the fortnight-long regime, 
was more obviously founded on that tradition of what he viewed as 
'strong...left nationalism', derived from the regimes of Toro and 
Busch in the '30s and Villarroel in the '40s. Notwithstanding his 
connections with Banzer, the rebel colonel sought to establish 
a form of bonapartist regime in which the leading civic organisations 
participated in an administration directed by the armed forces. 
In this vein he proffered an alliance to both Congress and the COB, 
neither of which was outlawed for a number of days. The pact he 
envisaged allowed for the maintenance of parliament and trade union 
independence but 'under the discipline of the armed forces'. 
This ambition was thwarted on a number of fronts. First, and 
most importantly, the leadership of the COB lost control of the rank 
and file of its most powerful arm - the miners. The miners obliged 
their leader, Juan Lechin (also head of the COB), to call a general 
strike and then ignored him when, after reaffirming it every 24 
hours, he attempted to lift it to facilitate negotiations. The 
mines remained at a standstill and a number of ill-organised military 
efforts at a full occupation to force the men back to work were 
resisted, giving the lead for a total stoppage to be maintained in 
the cities. This action was paralleled by the most emphatically 
radical mobilisation in 30 years on the part of the campesinado, 
which achieved a rare unity in coming out on strike and blocking 
the major roads, the Altiplano being particularly hard-hit by this 
measure. These actions were maintained for two weeks and con-
stituted the margin by which all political negotiations were under-
taken. ^  Both the military and the political parties of the centre 
seemed taken aback by the popular response to the coup; certainly 
Natusch made a grave error in failing immediately to silence the 
unions' radio stations and the popular press, which continued for 
a number of days to urge opposition. 
The coup was also emphatically opposed by the Karachipampas, 
who initially attempted to reverse it but were beaten back and 
detained. Padilla also came out against Natusch and immediately 
went underground to form a potent partnership with Guevara, 
now blessed with a popularity that eluded him when he held power. 
Both these figures felt able to maintain an intransigent position 
because of the early and unambiguous opposition to the rebellion 
on the part of the State Department, which cut all economic and 
military aid and refused to countenance recognition. The Natusch 
coup represented the first positive setback to the Carter policy of 
cultivating 'viable' democratic governments and for this it paid 
the price. (Once it had taken this stance, and it had been seen 
to be effective, Washington was not only obliged but also ready to 
maintain it, a factor that contributed strongly to the isolation 
of the regime established the following July. In this respect as 
well as several others the Natusch episode resonated strongly in 
the Garcia coup.) Washington's position, therefore, gave the mili-
tary and civilian opposition to Natusch a distant but powerful veto 
that complemented the action of the labour movement. 
The attitude of the leading political parties was far less clear 
and contributed to the further diminution of their authority and 
popularity. Natusch had secured the support of a number of maverick 
dignitaries from both the MNR and the MNRI and, although he persistently 
denied it, Victor Paz appeared to have knowledge of the colonel's plans 
and to be far from antipathetic towards them in the early stages of 
the short-lived regime. Paz was not able to escape this suspicion, 
which, in view of his past record and the accusations of a number of 
Natusch supporters, was not lightly held and certainly damaged the 
MNR's electoral chances. 
More surprisingly, the main parties of the UDP did not escape 
from related suspicions of a lack of total commitment to parlia-
mentary democracy when Congress began to discuss its options and 
then to negotiate with Natusch. The PCS was most vulnerable in that 
it had reacted to the U.S. boycott in an almost pavlovian manner and 
began to construe Natusch's 'nationalism' in a positive light. In 
this they were at one with the Soviet embassy, which soon recognised 
the regime, invited its leader to the mission to celebrate the anni-
versary of the Russian Revolution, and acted as a conduit for talks 
with the COB. When parliament discussed the possibility of 
Natusch's idea of a triumvirate of the armed forces, Congress and 
the COB, the PCB took a discernably soft line. Equally, the MIR, 
which was not slow to criticise its UDP ally for being less than 
resolute in defence of parliament, itself dwelt for a time on the 
possibility of a compromise; it was before long to return to such 
a position.^ Congress, therefore, did little to enhance its re-
putation by continuing to seek a rapprochement with the military 
when the majority of those who had voted for sovereign constitu-
tional government were absolutely opposed to any retreat; in 
November 1979 parliament defended itself with markedly less commit-
ment than did the voters. 
In the short-term the right was scarcely less damaged by the 
Natusch coup than was the parliamentary left. Paz, Washington's 
candidate, was tainted by his early support for the rebellion but 
soon forced to oppose it, which went some way to restoring favour 
in Washington but brought him into open conflict with the high 
command which viewed turncoats with greater derision than open 
antagonists. The senior officers themselves found that they had 
embarked upon an endeavour that had gone badly wrong, not least 
because of the confusion in Natusch's position. Within a few 
days of the coup it became apparent that the high command had 
been able to overcome the colonel's ambitions and had taken direct 
command of the movement, Natusch remaining a virtual prisoner in 
the presidential palace. However, the deep opposition of the 
labour movement and the unanticipated antipathy of Washington pre-
cluded the possibility of pressing forward with the offensive. 
Accordingly, Natusch was kept in place while the generals obtained 
the conditions for a well-guarded tactical withdrawal, an 
undertaking that obliged them to direct the blame for the coup onto 
Natusch himself. Only when these conditions were given was the 
colonel permitted to resign. Natusch had become their pawn but 
he still possessed considerable authority within the armed forces 
and his example was to guarantee him a broad constituency, including 
even some Karachipampas, in the coming period; after July 1980 
this following was to be harnessed to the general opposition to the 
senior officers who had hijacked his rebellion. 
This element of disunity also extended in part to the ADN, which 
had taken a pro-Natusch position in the early days but soon with-
drew and found itself in conflict with the high command over its 
treatment of the colonel and its attitude to the U.S. It is hard 
to 'read1 the ADN's position at this stage with confidence, but it 
would seem an acceptable hypothesis to intepret its actions as 
being in line with a continuing commitment to some form of 'guided 
democracy* whereby it could exploit the not inconsiderable resources 
it had invested in the image and apparatus of the party provided 
that it could still retain a good margin of autonomy in its alliance 
with a military regime. Natusch apparently offered this, and so 
the optimum conditions existed for the ADN to take power at some 
future stage. This project was, of course, nullified by Washing-
ton's stance, but it should be borne in mind that the generals 
seemed set upon a completely institutional movement, in which the 
ADN would have had but a supportive role. 
The immediate resolution to the Natusch crisis, reached on 
16 November, was the appointment of Lidia Gueiler, president of 
Congress, to serve as interim president until the 1980 poll. The 
military refused absolutely to accept the reinstatement of Guevara, 
which was interpreted as tantamount to a complete defeat. Gueiler's 
appointment was celebrated as a definitive popular victory, but in 
practice it represented a substantial compromise on the part of the 
constitutionalist camp since the golpistas were not only allowed to 
retreat to the barracks without retribution but also placed under 
the authority of a president who was expected to - and, in fact, 
did - leave them entirely undisturbed. In retrospect it may be 
asserted that the Natusch coup constituted the first step of the 
rebellion of 17 July 1980, providing the army with what it perceived 
as a 'globo de ensayo' and an extremely strong position from which 
to harass the established government. 
The appointment of Gueiler was not in itself a surprise, apart 
from stemming from the official position she ^ possessed. Although 
she had for many years been a member of Lechin's PRIN, her political 
origins were on the extreme right of the MNR, and over the previous 
two years she had returned to her alliance with Paz. The new pre-
sident was, therefore, like Guevara, sufficiently conservative to 
allay the fears of the bulk of the military and to guarantee its 
autonomy but she also possessed enough contacts with the centre-
left in Congress to gain its acceptance of her appointment, which 
still enabled the UDP to operate as an opposition and maximise the 
advantages this gave it in the run-down to the elections. Paz 
now came to the fore, and the majority of Gueiler's cabinets belonged 
to the MNR or to parties allied with it, its leader being dubbed 
the 'king without a crown'. The PCB-ML, remaining faithful to its 
strategic line, entered the government but exercised no influence 
within it, the party membership reaping the rewards of being 
closely attached to a distinctly conservative and yet impotent 
administration without any obvious benefit other than a trickle 
of posts. Bolivian maoism went into a deep decline which many 
commentators considered irreversible in all but the long term. 
The extent of the popular victory obtained in the removal of 
Natusch was revealed to be minimal when, within only a week of his 
downfall, one of his leading patrons General Luis Garcia Meza (the 
new president's cousin) staged a 'passive coup' in La Paz's main 
Miraflores barracks in a refusal to accept the new military appoint-
ments made by Gueiler which broadly favoured the anti-golpistas. 
This move drove the armed forces into a further acute and highly 
public division and seemed set to provoke a major battle in the 
capital. However, neither Gueiler nor Washington was prepared to 
hazard another crisis under the threat of a mass uprising with the 
military incapacitated as a repressive force. The same outcome 
was obtained in the end-of-year promotions and postings: a nominal 
balancing of the two broad factions but a decided advantage being 
received by the hardliners. This policy of placating the 'ultras' 
in the army was all the more important because Gueiler had decided 
to move immediately in responding to the IMF's requirement of a 
devaluation in return for the new stand-by loan and a restructuring of 
the country's repayment schedule; it was also plain that further 
U.S. backing depended upon such a move. The 25% devaluation of 
the peso on 29 November was in itself an insufficient response to 
the deepening fiscal crisis of the state but it was, nonetheless, 
a bold move for a regime that was less than a fortnight old, lacked 
any popular mandate, and was sorely taxed in holding a fundamentally 
hostile military apparatus together within days of a general strike 
the like of which the country had not witnessed for 30 years. 
Popular reaction to the devaluation was far less emphatic than 
was feared by the regime; this reflected a critical alteration in 
the balance of forces from that which had prevailed only a few days 
before. Having come to the fore of the negotiations with the 
military, the COB, on which the UDP possessed a clear majority, 
adopted the position that however great its opposition to the de-
valuation, priority should be given to the preservation of par-
liamentary democracy and the maintenance of. the Gueiler adminis-
tration. As a result, the trade union leadership moved quickly 
to break any further mobilisation by the rank and file which would, 
in all probability, have resulted in the collapse of the adminis-
tration and an open confrontation between the working class and 
the armed forces. This policy on the part of the majority of the 
COB leadership contributed to a discernible reflux in the militancy 
of the industrial labour force, which was exhausted after the 
general strike and still somewhat confused at its outcome. Accor-
dingly, despite considerable pressure from the revolutionary left, 
the response of the miners and factory workers to the devaluation 
was limited to a token 24-hour stoppage on 10 December. 
However, the campesinado, traditionally the early victim of 
devaluations and hitherto the least able to mount a coherent 
opposition to them, responded to the measure with even greater 
radicalism than it had done to the Natusch coup. The peasant union 
(CSUTCB), which had achieved an unprecedented degree of unity under 
the leadership of the paceno leader Genaro Flores, decreed the 
renewal of rural strikes and road blockades. Arrangements were 
made for the direct provisioning of the mines and major factories 
in reaffirmation of the peasant-worker alliance but the campesinos 
showed no disposition to negotiate. Nevertheless, the COB re-
fused to back its peasant affiliate and after a number of days 
the CSUTCB was obliged to back down. As a consequence of this 
Flores withdrew his important support of the UDP and relations 
inside the COB were decidedly sour for a time but the campesinos 
maintained their membership and Flores continued to play an im-
portant part in the federation's work. 
The failure to achieve a worker-peasant alliance in early 
December accelerated the downturn in popular militancy and it may 
be seen as a critical event in the notable absence of a popular 
political alternative to parliamentarianism, an alternative that 
should not be judged simply the figment of the imagination of the 
radical left but a potential successor to the formation of the 
COB (1952) and the Asamblea Popular (1971). Over the coming months 
this absence came to be ever more important in an atmosphere of 
growing tension as the golpistas increased their hold over the 
lacklustre Gueiler regime and posed a growing threat to the June 
poll. 
This threat took a form seldom seen in Bolivia - the use of 
discrete acts of terrorism against left-wing figures and the clear 
deployment of a sophisticated 'strategy of tension'. This owed 
much to the presence of a considerable number of Argentine military 
advisers brought in by the new head of military intelligence, 
Colonel Luis Arce Gomez, and Garcia Meza, who was appointed army 
commander in April 1980 in the face of much opposition both inside 
the military and out. Garcia's promotion marked the final capture 
of the high command by officers who had been pledged to convert 
Natusch's coup into a full institutional dictatorship. The bombing 
of the offices of the independent left-wing paper Aqui in February 
and the assassination of its director, the Jesuit film critic 
Luis Espinal, in March were widely accepted to be the work of Arce's 
'Segunda Seccion', which also engaged in numerous other less pub-
licised acts of destabilisation. Garcia complemented this tactic 
by making a series of speeches in condemnation of 'anarcho-syndi-
calism', 'corrupt politicians' and the notion of parliamentary 
democracy, for which Bolivians were not ready and which could only 
lead to 'anarchy and chaos 
These indications of the advanced stage of the military challenge 
to the elections drew an emphatic response from the U.S. ambassador 
who warned against a coup and threatened full sanctions should one 
be attempted; this unleashed a welter of condemnations of 'imperia-
list intervention' from the right and the military, including the 
high c o m m a n d . T h i s new contradiction reached its peak in June, 
when a new ambassador was declared persona non grata by the army 
general staff, and General Echeverria, commander of the Santa Cruz 
garrison, threatened to march on the capital unless the diplomat 
left the country. One of the ironies of this reversal of the 
normal relationship between Washington and the Bolivian military 
was that the parliamentary parties, excluding the ADN - which kept 
as low a profile in the matter as it could manage - and the FSB -
which attempted the highest it could achieve - but including the 
nominally anti-imperialist MIR, came increasingly to defend Carter 
and depend on U.S. support while the right and the military stole 
their traditional anti-U.S. mantle. There can be little doubt 
that reliance on Washington came to represent, for the UD? at least, 
the ultimate guarantee against a further coup. 
Another factor which restrained popular mobilisation against 
the fortification of the ultras was the decision of the COB to join 
with the major political formations - UDP; MNR; PS-1 - to form a 
fundamentally defensive alliance against any future rebellion. 
The Consejo Nacional de Defensa de la Democracia (CONADE) was estab-
lished in mid-April 1980 with the aim of coordinating a general 
strike and road blocks in the event of a coup against the elections. 
This appeared to betoken a new degree of unity between the political 
parties and the union movement; yetv CONADE not only acted as a 
mechanism to withhold mobilisation against the military before any 
coup but was also an organisation that lacked any real existence on 
the ground; it was the result of a paper agreement, as was later 
admitted by its staunchest defender, the MIR.11 Shortly after its 
formation, the COB endeavoured to demonstrate its good intentions 
to the regime (from which it was now demanding major wage increases) 
by signing a pact for mutual non-aggression and respect for the 
democratic process with the armed forces1 high command. This move 
did nothing to enhance the popularity of CONADE and little to in-
crease confidence in the COB leadership, especially after Garcia 
rapidly and emphatically denied that the pact compromised the mili-
tary in any way. The army commander once again returned to his 
denunciations of the elections, attempted in league with his 
colleagues to have them postponed for a year, and threatened to bring 
members of Congress to trial in front of a court martial for their 
impeachment of Banzer. An attempt on the life of the president 
by the commander of her bodyguard, the bombing of a number of 
election meetings, and the killing of four senior members of the UDP 
following the sabotage of a plane they had hired from a company owned 
by Arce and the notorious Colonel 'Buby1 Salomon (an accident from 
which the MIR leader Jaime Paz Zamora miraculously escaped with his 
life and which Siles himself only avoided by having to attend the 
funeral of a relation) reflected the increasing pressure under which 
the entire democratic experiment was placed. 
By May it had become obvious that a failure to obtain a clear 
result in the poll would inevitably lead to a coup, the diminution 
of popular enthusiasm for elections assuredly making any rebellion 
much easier to effect. It was, though, widely anticipated that 
any such move by the army would be delayed a while until the new 
regime had lost any vestige of prestige and backing, allowing the 
coup to be gilded with some of the populist motifs evident in 
Natusch1s project. Despite the marked decline in Paz's popularity 
resulting from his attachment not only to the November revolt but 
also to the distinctly unpopular Gueiler government, it was not 
clear that the UDP would achieve a working majority in parliament 
or a decisive victory in the presidential poll. Indeed, many on 
the left and in the unions had shifted away from the alliance both 
towards the PS--1 and, in a less coherent manner, towards the idea 
of an independent workers' candidature proposed in vague form by 
Lechin, who distrusted Siles as a result of their conflicts in the 
50s and was deeply suspicious of the PCB, with which he continually 
had to contend inside the COB over the issue of alliances with 
'nationalist' military figures. 
This issue came to the fore at the FSTMB congress at the southern 
mining camp of Telamayu in late April. At this congress the PCB, in 
the person of Simon Reyes, its leading figure in the union, attempted 
to swing the miners behind the UDP as a matter of union policy. 
Significantly, both the well-represented MIR and PS-1 were virtually 
silent, the only other major resolution coming from Ascensio Cruz, 
a young delegate of the POR who produced a clear Trotskyist critique 
of the entire electoralist strategy and effectively restated the 
continuing presence and influence of this political current despite 
its lack of positions on the national executive. Cruz was easily 
overcome by Lechin, who at the last moment produced a 'compromise' 
resolution calling for a workers' candidature separate from the UDP. 
This had the effect of reinforcing the electoral path although it put 
the precise position of the country's most influential union into a 
good deal of confusion. It was only after the coup that the 
rejection of this strategy regained credibility in a perhaps predic-
table resurgence and acceptance of Trotskyist positions by workers 
who have historically shown them sympathy in times of repression 
and dictatorship.13 
Lechin's position ultimately served to increase confusion rather 
than unity. Although he persuaded Flores to join him on the slate, 
this went under the name of his own party (PRIN), and was perceived 
as a largely opportunist move and failed to draw away much support 
from the UDP and PS-1. However, Lechin did not withdraw until the 
very last moment and his final grudging endorsement of the UDP came 
too late to avoid the removal of his name from the voting slips. 
Slightly different problems bedevilled a virtually simultaneous 
effort to establish a united left front on the part of Marcelo 
Quiroga, who proposed to the UDP in the name of the PS-1 that they 
and the other smaller parties of the left should form a combined 
slate of all workers' parties. The negotiations over this pro-
posal were followed very closely since they promised to produce 
an alliance somewhat similar to Unidad Popular in Chile, but the 
UDP eventually rejected it since, as the PCB explained, its parties 
sought to establish a cross-class alliance, not a single-class 
candidature. 
Thus, the left entered the elections of 29 June in a state of 
some disarray and minimal unity. Although the UDP won the greatest 
number of seats of any party and was the clear overall victor, its 
total vote (507,173) was lower than in 1979; this reflected an 
important shift to the PS-1, which made a remarkable advance in 
winning 11% of the vote (113,959). Support for the MNR fell sub-
stantially, as expected (263,706), and the old caudillo Paz was 
quick to state that the UDP should form the next government, al-
though to what end was never entirely clear. Banzer's ADN 
increased its vote, most probably at the expense of both the MNR 
and the FSB, and came a close third (220,309); the party gave no 
indication that it would adopt any other course than providing 
a concerted right wing opposition inside Congress. Although the 
PS-1 seemed set to require substantial concessions for its support 
for a UDP government; a clear and workable result had been obtained 
for the first time in three elections. 
Siles duly entered into discussions with the military but re-
fused to make any concessions over guaranteeing the posts of the 
existing high command and simply restated the UDP's policy of 
adhering to the armed forces' ley organica. Thus Garcia 
and his colleagues-General Waldo Bernal of the airforce and Admiral 
Terrazas of the navy - could legitimately expect to be removed from 
their posts and replaced by members of the Karachipampas. 
These discussions were undertaken in secret but the days follow-
ing the poll were nevertheless very tense since the military's stated 
position of the elections for the last four months had been both 
negative and insistent. Moreover, they were known to be especially 
antipathetic to the UDP, which was characterised as 'communist' 
because of the membership of the PCB. This position was also echoed 
by the Argentine regime of General Videla which had on a number of 
occasions declared that it would not tolerate prospective centres 
of 'subversion' on its borders. Yet, however deeply ingrained the 
fears of a military reaction were, they were set against factors 
which seemed to militate against a coup, at least in the short-term. 
These included the operable decision of the poll, the inclusion of 
the ADN into the electoral orbit and its far from poor showing in 
the poll, the belief that Arce and Garcia were only a minority 
inside the army and adequately balanced by the institucionalista 
current, the strong backing of Washington, and the existence of 
CONADE, which was taken to represent the legacy of the popular 
defeat of Natusch and a major disincentive for any further military 
moves. 
On this basis the uprising of the Trinidad garrison early on 
17 July - before the new government had taken office - came as a 
shock but was not initially treated with the gravity that it 
deserved; the response of the COB and the major parties was, as 
a result, both tardy and ill-organised. While this may be legiti-
mately discounted as the central cause of the success of the coup, 
it certainly played a part and manifested a number of long-standing 
weaknesses exhibited by the democratic camp, the most crucial of 
which was an underestimation of the preparation, power, entrenched 
interests and regional backing of the leadership of the armed forces. 
The Government of National Reconstruction 
The coup of 17 July 1980 was characterised by a very high level of 
preparation and a use of violence exceeding even that of November 
1979. Within hours of its outbreak it was understood to be less 
an effort to impose terms on the UDP or to rectify the electoral 
process than a movement to bring a definitive halt to the political 
experiment under way since early 1978. In that it has proved 
incapable of replacing the parliamentary project with an entrenched 
'organic' military regime it has failed in this endeavour. As 
Marcelo Quiroga - the first victim of the coup - remarked late in 
1979, the coup is the traditional means of obtaining power for the 
Bolivian military but in recent years it has resorted to the me-
chanism of elections when it enters crisis and requires cover for 
a retreat. By early 1982 the regime of General Celso Torrelio 
had adopted just such a course in announcing a new poll for 1983; 
within 18 months the crusade to eradicate all vestiges of civilian 
party activity had collapsed and the armed forces appeared to be 
engaged in a manoeuvre very similar to that undertaken by Banzer 
at the beginning of 1978. 
We may perceive a number of distinct phases in this process. 
The first was the attempt to launch an all-embracing and open-
ended institutional movement based on the reverses suffered by the 
popular movement, the left, and the civilian political elite as 
a result of the July coup. This period was marked by the pre-
dominance of Garcia, as president, and Arce, as minister of the 
interior; it ran from July until February 1981. 
The fall of Arce from office in late February 1981 reflected an 
accumulation of forces opposed to his proclivity for unrestrained 
repression and, more importantly, his complete identification with 
the production and trading of cocaine. On the one hand, these 
sectors sought to remove him to placate Washington, reduce the 
disastrous reputation of the regime and break out of a highly 
damaging diplomatic isolation; on the other, elements out of 
harmony with the government aimed to restore the relatively open 
conditions of competition that had prevailed in the industry until 
July 1980. They failed on both counts, in part because their ob-
jectives were mutually exclusive. However, Arce's disgrace dis-
located the ruling bloc, released the principal cocaine clans from 
the tight restrictions he had imposed upon them and led to the 
incorporation of new sectors of the military into the trade. This 
combined with the discontent of important factions of the army with 
the consequences of the first months of Garcia's rule to result 
in a period of acute institutional crisis, in which Garcia and his 
allies were confronted by a series of coups. 
This second phase ran from February to September 1981, during 
which time Garcia was gradually forced to withdraw from open control. 
However, the balance of forces was such that this retreat was never 
total despite a number of emphatic challenges (June and August). 
In August Garcia was finally obliged to relinquish the presidency 
but, with the barely-veiled support of the still influential Arce, 
he retained sufficient power to exercise control over the junta 
of commanders that succeeded him. Nonetheless, this arrangement 
proved unacceptable to the growing movement for a qualitative re-
laxation of the regime. Thus, a third phase opened with the 
replacement of the junta after less than a month by a single pre-
sident, the army commander Torrelio, who assumed power in September. 
Torrelio's first months of rule were by no means free of discord 
inside the armed forces but this was expressed in a far less 
extreme manner than had been evident earlier in the year despite 
the fact that Garcia and Arce continued to exercise much influence. 
The weakness of this third regime came less from military dissent 
than from a series of advances made by the labour movement, still 
disorientated and bereft of political leadership but reorganised 
at plant level and increasingly militant as a consequence of the 
severely deflationary policies, a devaluation and the harsh re-
pression directed by the military. The strikes of late 1981 and 
early 1982 won capitulation to the demands for independent unions 
and - in time - full democratic rights (demands that, at this 
stage, should certainly not be seen as co-substantial with that for 
elections) but these concessions were, at the time of writing, 
not fully implemented and had generated a new flurry of coup scares 
from the ultras led by Garcia and Arce, who feared complete mar-
ginalisation and continued to pose a threat to any authentic 
'apertura'. 
Not even the most detached and perspicacious observer could 
have foreseen these developments in the first few months following 
the July 1980 coup since the regime it established showed every 
sign of succeeding in its objective of founding a Bolivian variant 
of the long-standing military dictatorships of the Southern Cone. 
This was most apparent in the level and form of the repression 
employed from the very start of the rebellion. The lessons of the 
Natusch debacle had been fully inculcated and there was no evidence 
of hesitation or discrimination on the part of the rebel forces. 
Radio stations, the COB headquarters, government offices, the 
presidential palace and all strategic points in La Paz were captured 
without resistance in lightning raids by paramilitary forces using 
ambulances to mask their approach and provoking a general terror 
in their operations. CONADE had no time to coordinate a general 
strike; its leaders, including Lechin, were captured, killed 
(Quiroga, Carlos Flores, Gualberto Vega) or forced immediately to 
go underground. In this way potential foci of resistance were 
eradicated and the leadership of both the union movement and the 
political parties effectively decapitated. Moreover, the initial 
use of paramilitary forces - Argentines, FSB militants and various 
criminal and lumpen elements in the employment of the cocaine in-
terests - enabled it to be realised with remarkable speed. By the 
time troops were investing the principal urban centres the movement's 
success was assured and there was no opportunity for effective op-
position to be launched inside the military. Thus, the mechanics 
of the coup temporarily suppressed currents of discontent within 
the armed forces but neither confronted nor overcame them. The 
institutional character of the coup was further confirmed when, 
after momentary bickering as to the precise form of the new regime, 
Garcia was sworn in as head of a junta comprising himself, Bernal 
and Terrazas in the Miraflores barracks rather than, as ordained 
by tradition, in the presidential palace. 
The arrival of the 'new order' was not simply evident in the 
extensive deployment of troops in the first months of the govern-
ment. The most obvious indication of an alteration in the norms 
of military conduct lay in the high profile and constant activity 
of the paramilitary forces, controlled by Arce's ministry of the 
interior and denominated the Servicio Especial de Seguridad (SES). 
In the first assault it was this force that undertook the principal 
actions, and it continued to provide the shock-force of the regime 
in overseeing unprecedented numbers of arrests,' the extensive use 
of torture and a very rigorous implementation of the tight curfew. 
Indeed, so integral to the maintenance of the regime did the SES 
become that it survived Arce's tenure of office and continues, 
albeit under a different name, to possess considerable powers and 
remain largaly independent from the formal military hierarchy. 
The custom of members of SES to loot the houses of their victims 
and exercise little or no restraint in their activities certainly 
sowed a deep fear in the civilian population but it also generated 
a very wide sense of resentment and opposition to a government 
that proclaimed itself the incarnation of probity, order and 
Christian values. In the last resort, the regime's zeal in re-
pression proved to be counterproductive.^ 
The activities of the SES, which by the end of 1980 numbered 
7,000 men, were nonetheless consonant with the central themes of 
Garcia's pronouncements until he fell from office; the new regime 
was the product of chaos engendered by corrupt politicians, castro-
communists and subversive priests; its purpose was to wipe out 
these currents and establish a new 'democracia inedita' based on 
discipline, moral regeneration and the 'transcendent' values of 
nationalism. It was to be a 'Government of National Reconstruction' 
with no determinate life-span. It could last 'five, ten or twenty 
years, whatever it takes to remove the cancer of Marxism'.20 
Statements of this genre are familiar to all who have a passing 
knowledge of the Southern Cone regimes and it was precisely on 
their model that Garcia aimed to establish his government. This 
emulation went much further than the extensive employment of re-
pression although it soon encountered critical impediments in its 
efforts to remould civil society. 
The initial impact of the coup gave substance to the immediate 
prohibition of political parties. Even Banzer's ADN and the FSB -
largely exempt from harassment and tacitly permitted to continue 
in existence provided they made no public statements - were disori-
entated and marginalised at the beginning. Although Garcia 
claimed that his regime was a 'natural continuation' of Banzer's 
nationalist rule, he made no effort to cultivate the ADN, which 
was correctly viewed as representing not only a rival political 
force but also a nucleus for competition inside the military. 
Equally, while militants of the FSB were encouraged to serve in 
the SES, its leadership was studiously excluded from influence. 
Naturally enough, past and present adherents of these parties of 
the right were appointed to staff the higher echelons of the 
state apparatus but their authority derived from their commitment 
to the new regime and not from the insertion of the parties into 
the traditional circuit of patronage and influence; this did not 
occur for some six months, which would under normal circumstances 
be considered a very short time but in this case represented a 
significant political space. An even greater distance was opened 
up between the government and the MNR; some of the dissidents who 
had supported Natusch were incorporated but Paz himself and the 
leadership, which was closely identified with Gueiler, were brusquely 
retired to private life. 
The parties of the left were hit very badly. In organisational 
terms only the PCB and the very small POR were structured in a 
sufficiently disciplined manner to embark on clandestine activity 
in the short-term. The rest of the left suffered the natural 
consequences of having developed out of tight cadre-based for-
mations into large, loose-knit electoral vehicles. Without 
Quiroga or a well-established presence in the unions, the PS-1 was 
eclipsed as emphatically as it had flourished in the previous 
period. The MIR, the origins of which had been firmly situated 
in clandestine activity under Banzer, suffered more than any other 
group because it was a prime target for the military. It also 
entered into a period of internal debate and dissent with several 
loose factions being formed. The leadership based around Jaime 
Paz laid great stress on its links with social democracy, solidarity 
from the governments of the Andean Pact and - most contentiously -
Washington. Paz's contacts with the State Department did not halt 
even after Reagan came to office, and this caused much tension not 
only with the PCB inside the UDP but also inside the MIR itself. 
Many militants inside the country rejected the Paz line, some moving 
towards Trotskyist positions in a self-criticism of the party's 
dependence on electoralism, others adopting guerrillaist positions.21 
Yet, as in the case of the PCB and MNRI, the MIR still possessed 
a strong nucleus in the union leadership, which now came to head 
internal opposition and locate resistance in the syndicalism that 
has proved the most durable feature of the Bolivian left. This 
development acquired even greater emphasis following the early 
failure of the UDP to mount a defence of its electoral victory by 
declaring a clandestine Gobierno de Unidad Nacional (GUN), which 
was set up on the day the alliance should have assumed power -
6 August.22 Siles's call to arms in this move was, in the event, 
a miscalculation since the UDP was in no position to realise the 
GUN in any other form than as an organ for propaganda; even more 
than CONADE, the GUN possessed only a phantom existence. Once 
this was recognised and popular expectations fell away, Siles left 
the country (September) and the project was tacitly dropped although 
both the MIR and the MNRI continued to make occasional references 
to it for nearly a year.23 
The regime's labour policy formed the centre-piece of its cor-
porativist ambitions. Following Banzer's example of running a 
network of labour 'coordinadores', the junta's Decree 17531 of 
21 July suppressed all labour rights granted under the 1967 Con-
stitution and effectively outlawed all independent unions with the 
exception of the transport workers who had always been faithful 
banzeristas and gave early support to Garcia Meza. Decree 17545 
of 12 August established government-appointed 'relacionadores' as 
the only legal representatives of the working class, and Decree 
17610 of 7 September declared that henceforth a 'social pact' 
would exist between capital and labour, all the terms of which 
would be stipulated by the regime. This policy was implemented 
with appreciable speed; within three months over 1,000 'relaciona-
dores ' had received their credentials. 
However, the regime was never able to impose a 'yellow' apparatus 
in any other than a coercive and superficial manner; when, by mid-
1981, this apparatus came under pressure from rank and file mili-
tancy it began to disintegrate remarkably quickly. Nevertheless, 
this was not a uniform process and followed the pattern established 
in the uneven resistance to the coup in its first weeks. 
The early success of the offensive against the unions owed 
much to the speed and harshness of the coup, which decapitated the 
COB. The capture of Lechin was a particular bonus for the military 
and three days after the coup they obliged him to make a TV broad-
cast urging the workers to call off their general strike to avoid 
further loss of life. Although the labour leader looked dishevelled 
and disorientated, his appeal had a profound impact and certainly 
played a part in convincing the urban workers that they had lost 
their leadership and were left with no choice but to retreat. 
Thus, within a week the strike called by CONADE had effectively 
collapsed in the towns; it was only in the large and traditionally 
militant factories of Manaco (Cochabamba) and Said (La Paz) that a 
clandestine rank and file union was able to establish a firm exis-
tence . 
This position contrasted completely with the junta's endeavour 
to secure rapid control of the mines, the real heartland of the 
Bolivian proletariat and the single most important obstacle to the 
consolidation of the new regime. The full-scale military campaign 
to occupy and subdue the mines took three weeks, witnessed a number 
of mutinies by conscripts, and, after a number of partial with-
drawals, failed to result in a complete defeat of the workers. The 
resistance to this offensive matched the scale of the miners' mo-
bilisations of 1942, 1946, 1952 and 1971, encompassing the entire 
population of the camps and leading to large numbers of casualties. 
Use of airpower ensured the army's final control of the camps but 
in the important centre of Siglo XX-Catavi the strength of opposition 
enabled the workers to withdraw with a number of guarantees and the 
bulk of their union organisation sufficiently intact to go under-
ground in an efficient manner. The same occurred in Huanuni, the 
overall effect in these two large camps being to diminish the autho-
rity of the 'relacionadores' completely. 
Armed resistance in the mines was only finally stopped on 
3 August after troops massacred the inhabitants of the isolated 
Viloco and Caracoles pits.26 xhe failure to impose a categorical 
defeat on the miners was not immediately obvious - the camps became 
the site of a singularly harsh repressive regime and were flooded 
with troops. However, when, at the end of October> the local 
commander in Siglo XX attempted to eradicate the widespread practice 
of sabotage and go-slows by arresting a number of prominent FSTMB 
militants, the regime was faced with a strike that underlined the 
precariousness of its control. The stoppage at the end of October 
and early November represented the first step in the gradual re-
covery of the miners and propelled the formation of clandestine 
unions, which, while experiencing difficulties in communications, 
provided the basis for the regeneration of the COB in the interior. 
Over the following 18 months it was these ad hoc bodies headed by 
plant-level militants that led the campaign to reject the relaciona-
dores, organised strike action in liaison with the factory workers 
and headed local resistance committees. In Siglo XX they came 
under a strong Trotskyist influence; elsewhere they tended to 
reflect a return to militant syndicalism, veering towards Lechin's 
PRIN and somewhat away from the MIR and PCB, which at times argued 
for the recognition and use of the post of relacionador when this 
was subject to election in open assembly. Their success may be 
judged by the number of strikes that took place in the industrial 
sector over the first 18 months of the military regime. 7 
Garcia?s government met with greater immediate success in its 
policy of 'regenerating' the university and intimidating the church, 
the liberal sectors of which it identified as co-substantial with 
'subversion'. The universities were closed for nine months follow-
ing the coup. The majority of their staff were purged and replaced 
with the banzeristas who had been removed in the free academic elec-
tions of 1978; this limpieza was part of an extensive masacre blanca 
in the public service which went well beyond the customary clientel-
ist turnover. The impact was felt at all levels of the middle 
class for many students were expelled under the new statutes that 
replaced the universities' traditional autonomous status, placed 
them under the direct control of military appointees, led to massive 
increases in fees and dismantled many areas of the curriculum, par-
ticularly in the humanities. 
The offensive against the church was less predictable, largely 
because the institution has always been poor, heavily dependent on 
the support of the Vatican and, as a result, noticeably lacking in 
an indigenous body of radical priests of any size. Nonetheless, 
it became the target of a zealous persecution, with many ecclesias-
tical establishments being raided, significant numbers of clerics 
being detained and tortured as 'theologians of liberation' and 
'traitors to Western Christendom'. The liberal Archbishop Manrique 
of La Paz was singled out for particularly insistent criticism and 
molestation but, as elsewhere in Latin America, it was the orders -
particularly the Jesuits - that were attacked most emphatically 
and forced to reduce very greatly their pastoral work in both the 
towns and the countryside. The church hierarchy remained haras-
sed but largely untouched; for over a year it described its re-
lations with the regime as 'normal but not cordial'. It continued 
to protest the violation of human rights and distanced itself from 
the regime without ever openly condemning it. This enabled it to 
preserve an autonomy which the armed forces themselves were to find 
extremely valuable as they began to divide and require an arbiter. 
On the international plane the new regime found itself com-
pletely isolated and it was forced to rely heavily on the support 
of the Southern Cone dictatorships, particularly Argentina. The 
junta's repeated attacks on the Andean Pact were essentially poli-
tical in motivation and owed much to the fact that the exiled UDP 
leaders received valuable support from the civilian governments 
of the member states. On at least a dozen occasions in the second 
half of 1980 Garcia threatened to withdraw Bolivia from the Pact, 
which he accused of forcing an 'alien political system on the 
country'. However, he was persuaded out of precipitate action 
by extensive lobbying on the part of the private enterprise federa-
tion (CEPB), important members of which depended heavily on the 
Andean market and the Pact's assistance, and the leaders of the 
armed forces development agency (COFADENA) which was similarly 
vulnerable to a break in relations.30 By the end of the year 
Bolivia's position was one of an anomalous 'abstention', and while 
political relations remained cool, there was a gradual re-establish-
ment of diplomatic and economic links. 
The infinitely more critical question of relations with the U.S. 
was not resolved with the same ease; from the start it contributed 
greatly to the progressive debilitation of the junta. The scale 
of the problem became obvious when the Reagan administration failed 
to reverse the boycott of the Carter government, replacing the 
anulment of parliamentary democracy with involvement in the cocaine 
trade as the principal reason for this policy. Considering the 
extreme economic and political vulnerability of the regime and the 
relatively greater space it had for reversing the boycott on the new 
grounds, the ineptitude of its response is surprising. Garcia and 
his colleagues made persistent attacks on 'all forms of imperialism' 
for a number of months and made none but the most transparent moves 
to disassociate themselves from cocaine or cultivate favour in 
Washington. In this they were not helped by the actions of a number 
of amateur confidential agents' to the U.S., appointed because of 
the paucity of career diplomats prepared to serve the regime. It 
was only well into 1981, when Garcia's internal support was palpably 
on the wane, that the technocrats of the ADN were harnessed to 
ameliorate relations, very few of them staying at the job once 
Banzer himself had signalled that he would break from the government. 
As a result, Washington held back from sanctioning badly needed IMF 
stand-by loans for a full 15 months although the Fund continued to 
send missions to La Paz and prepare plans for a full emergency 
package. One significant factor in this policy must have been the 
State Department's conviction that Bolivia was notably free of 
'subversive influences', that the UDP did not represent an impediment 
to hemispheric security, and that the new regime was not only 
thoroughly discredited by we11-documented attachments to narcotra-
fico but also a liability in that it was likely to generate insti-
tutional disunity and mass discontent. 
While the support of the Southern Cone offered a degree of po-
litical compensation for this remarkable isolation, it was incapable 
of meeting the economic needs of the regime, Argentina alone offering 
very modest assistance in the first instance and then retreating from 
further commitments. Thus, in the short term the split from the U.S. 
fortified the corporativist tenor of the government and compelled it 
to take an uncompromising stance in international affairs, but within 
nine months it had become plain that this position was utterly un-
tenable. As a result, the regime faced a concerted challenge from 
the established forces of the right, which held out the prospect of 
mending the fences with the U.S. 
A less publicised but by no means minor weakness of the Garcia 
apparatus was its failure to establish a base in the peasantry, which 
has always been a crucial constituency for military regimes through 
the mechanism of the Pacto Militar-Campesino (1964-). There are a 
number of causes for this important absence. Most importantly, the 
economic crisis precluded any indulgence of the vociferous claims 
for commercial preference on the part of the campesinado, a fact 
that was made resoundingly clear in January 1981, when the junta's 
first major economic initiative removed state subsidies from a 
wide range of foodstuffs and basic necessities and hit the peasantry 
with particular severity. This necessitated a temporary but sharp 
increase in repression in the countryside, especially in the mining 
regions and in the traditionally militant department of La Paz 
where there had been nuclei of determined resistance to the coup 
on the part of the peasant union, unlike elsewhere in the country. 
However, if in general the campesinos responded to the rebellion in 
much the same manner as the urban working class by adopting a rapid 
retreat, it did not suffer such heavy losses in its leadership. 
The CSUTCB and the various new campesino political parties - MRTK 
and the various factions of MITKA - remained active in the Altiplano 
and derived appreciable support by virtue of Flores1 position as 
temporary head of the COB, the first campesino ever to hold this 
post in the trade union movement. This enabled important sectors 
of the peasantry to provide an effective opposition to the old 
barrientista apparatus, rapidly resurrected after the coup to run 
the government-sponsored union. The attachment of these apparat-
chiks to the memory of Banzer - unforgiven for the 1973 devaluation 
and the Tolata massacre of 1974 - as well as to that of the Natusch 
coup - which, to all intents and purposes marked the end of the 
pacto in the Altiplano and the Cochabamba valley - deprived them 
of any real following in their old fiefs. Garcia's numerous 
visits to the countryside failed to alter this position, the new 
president being a singularly poor orator3 unable to speak either 
Quechua or Aymara, and lacking in charisma. At no stage since 
the coup - even in the crisis of August 1981, when substantial 
efforts were made to mobilise it - have appreciable numbers of 
the campesinado rallied to the defence of the military. To date 
this has had the effect of severely limiting the regime's political 
options; in the future it may well prove much more critical. 
Deep popular antipathy and isolation from Washington were 
predictable impediments for the regime; the degree to which it 
was destabilised by dissidence from within the domestic ruling 
class was much more surprising. The strength of this opposition 
may be judged from the fact that before the end of 1980 it was 
being expressed in a muted but nonetheless telling manner inside 
the government's own, newly created policy-making body, the Consejo 
Nacional de Asesoramiento y Legislacion (CONAL). CONAL had been 
established in September precisely to rectify the absence of party 
political support and to compensate for the manifest lack of ex-
perience and expertise on the part of the members of the junta. 
Its president was General Juan Lechin Suarez, Banzer's minister of 
planning, ex-head of COMIBOL, and one of the most politically cap-
able officers to emerge since 1952. CONAL was largely comprised 
of retired officers but it also included civilian backers of Natusch 
from the MNR and MNRI and leading members from the ADN and FSB.31 
Its original brief was to prepare and advise on the formation of 
the new constitutional order and the planning of state policy. 
However, differences with the voluntarist designs of the Garcia-
Arce bloc grew as CONAL became the conduit for the interests of 
the established right. 
The first instance of this was the issue of the new security 
law which Arce planned to introduce in late September. This 
measure effectively provided for the suppression of the 1967 
Constitution, which was nominally still in force, and the institution 
of a national security regime very much of the type practised in the 
rest of the Southern Cone. The Church was the first to raise ob-
jections to this, principally because the draft statute provided for 
the death penalty to be reintroduced for a series of infractions. 
However, the expectation that Arce was seeking complete carte blanche 
for the SES consolidated opposition both within the military hierarchy 
and on the civil ian right. The alliance of these forces, the tacit 
support they received from CONAL, and the threat in early November of 
coup attempts from two senior banzerista officers commanding the 
garrisons of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz (Colonels Vargas Salinas and 
Echeverria) persuaded Garcia to withdraw the proposal rather than 
split a bloc he still hoped to unify under his leadership. 
There can be little doubt that one of the central reasons for 
the formation of this pact was a common rejection of the form of re-
pression practised by Arce and the SES, which threatened both the 
military's monopoly on such activity and its already badly tarnished 
reputation. This sentiment was further reinforced in January 1981 
when paramilitary forces executed eight leaders of the MIR in cold 
blood. The fact that one of the dead was the son of a senior general 
and that the killings were clearly unnecessary and had been conducted 
in a particularly barbarous manner served to fortify the conviction 
that Arce was out of control and breaking the implicit rules of re-
pression which, until 1980, had proscribed administering to the 
executions of individual members of the middle class. The impact 
of the January killings was considerable, and had the effect of 
divorcing the regime from many of the urban middle sectors who might 
have normally been expected to support it. 
If the Garcia junta acquired a deeply distasteful reputation on 
this score, it succeeded in amalgamating opposition in a much more 
fundamental manner with its economic policy. From the first days 
of its rule the government had given notice that it would avoid 
a devaluation, proceed to pare down Bolivia's lumbering and grossly 
inefficient state enterprises, and implement a comprehensive de-
flationary policy to regain creditworthiness with the IMF and the 
banks. By the end of 1980 it was apparent that the first steps 
in this process were under way, but the economic package of 10 January 
1981 was, in fact, less directly an attempt to woo the IMF than an 
endeavour to release funds for a state apparatus that was so im-
poverished that the salaries of its employees were three months in 
arrears. Wages were frozen and a wide range of state price subsidies 
- including those on petrol and oil - removed, at an estimated in-
flationary cost of over 35%. The state also reduced its social 
security commitment from 5C% to 33%, transferring the difference to 
employers and workers, a step that was roundly condemned by almost 
every sector. As a result of these moves the government saved 
itself around $200 million, but at the immediate cost of the price 
rises, a grave scarcity of provisions and outbreak of speculation, 
and a rise of interest rates to 32%.32 The oficialista leadership 
of CEPB formally approved the measures and urged greater speed in 
privatisation but this did not reflect the true position of the 
country's small and embattled industrial interests. The private 
mineowners' federation (ANMM) announced that their costs would be 
increased by some $35 million, or 50%, at a time when mining was 
iosing $39 million a year, international prices for tin constantly 
falling and the U.S. about to release further stocks from its 
strategic stockpile. It was not until April, when control of the 
CEPB was won by the banzeristas of the ANMM, that the private sector 
was able to exercise uniform pressure on the regime, but even at 
this stage the early and unmistakable signs of discontent from this 
sector combined with the wide support for a 48-hour general strike 
called by the COB in protest at the package clearly convinced the 
regime that it could not risk a devaluation. 
This dissonance was underlined by a sharp conflict between the 
government and the established interests of Santa Cruz, now the 
country's leading industrial centre and a vital constituency for 
the regime. Much of the friction was due to disagreements over 
the cocaine trade (see below) but there was more at stake than this. 
The initial rupture was caused by the administration's need for 
immediate revenue, which compelled it to reduce Santa Cruz's share 
of the royalties from oil income as part of the January measures, 
and its determination to continue with the development of the 
San Buenaventura agro-industrial complex in northern La Paz, 
posing a direct challenge to the under-utilised cruceno sugar in-
dustry. The resistance to these measures led Arce to take the 
bold move of intervening directly in the affairs of the Comite Pro 
Santa Cruz, an extremely powerful body that acted as the government 
of the department. Control of the Comite by the La Paz government 
was retained in the first months after the coup by dint of the 
normal system of political appointments and favours but the central 
importance of the oil royalties and the San Buenaventura project 
required more concerted action from Arce if thfe regime were to retain 
even nominal control over the east of the country. By early Feb-
ruary 1981 the minister of the interior was opposed by an alliance 
that comprised the principal agro-industrial interests, the ADN 
and FSB,(both of which were centred in Santa Cruz) and junta-member 
Bernal, who perceived an opportunity to curb Arce's power and 
improve his own political standing. 
Arce reacted to this challenge by setting up a Comite Civica 
Nacional, which would possess authority over all regional interest 
groups and civic bodies. However, the day after this new entity 
was declared Santa Cruz came out on a 24-hour general strike 
(10 February), against which no move was made by the garrison or 
the powerful airforce base, signalling local military complicity 
in the action. This produced a swift retreat on the part of the 
government, now forced to recognise the continuing power and autono-
my of the city's interests and the need to negotiate it with them. 
The region now became the centre of an intense struggle, one aspect 
of which was reflected in the fact that over 15 months of military 
rule its garrison was commanded by no less than eleven different 
officers. 
The success of the cruceno interests in stalling the government 
had an immediate effect on national politics: Garcia was compelled 
openly to seek Banzer's support and to widen his regime. Banzer, 
though, was clearly determined to extract maximum advantage from 
this position since the successes of the ADN over the previous two 
years merited more than a passing association with what was now 
perceived as an insecure military junta. A visit to Washington 
had the effect of hardening this resolve and making any entry of 
the ADN into government conditional upon a substantial relaxation 
and a 'measured return to democracy', laying the basis for the 
party's full assumption of power under the auspices of a 'controlled 
democracy'. This project represented a continuation of the Carter 
policy tailored to the immediate needs of the Reagan administration, 
which sought above all else a categorical separation of the Bolivian 
government from the cocaine trade and a refined image for authori-
tarian rule. On one point this policy coincided with the position 
of the majority of the domestic forces of the right: the removal 
of Arce, who was publicly associated with the trade more than any 
other figure. Garcia was no longer in a position to reject this 
demand and on 24 February Arce was removed from office along with 
the minister of education, Colonel Ariel Coca, similarly identified 
by the DEA as a leading narcotraficante. 
Cocaine 
Since the July 1980 coup Bolivia has been closely linked in the 
media with cocaine trafficking. To the extent that this associa-
tion has masked many of the issues raised above it has proved some-
what counter-productive in terms of reaching a full understanding 
of the nature of the military regime. Nevertheless, there can be 
little doubt that while many details of the trade remain unknown 
or obscure, both the coup and the successive regimes based upon it 
remained highly dependent upon cocadolares, the receipt of which 
rapidly engendered substantial difficulties both abroad and in 
terms of the domestic division of the spoils; in many respects the 
state was reduced to little less than the mechanism for direct 
plunder. 
Coca is, of course, a traditional crop in Bolivia and it is 
only recently that more than a very minor part of the coca leaf 
crop has been processed into cocaine sulphate and then pure cocaine. 
This industry grew slowly in the 1950s and did not properly flourish 
until the mid-VOs when, under the Banzer regime, the Santa Cruz agro-
industrial interests began to make serious investment in it. Pro-
duction in 1981 was estimated to be worth $2 billion, having in 1980 
reached $1.5 billion, a sum that partly explains the government's 
ability to survive - after a fashion - the effective bankruptcy of 
the state. Between 1978 and 1980 production of coca leaf was said 
by the ministry of agriculture to have doubled to 28,000 tons, but 
most sources estimate that the true figure was up to three times 
as large.36 The rise in demand in the U.S. and Europe enabled 
this expansion although cocaine still remains an 'elite' drug, very 
highly priced even when 'cut' (mixed with other substances), a 
practice that is generalised. Other factors in the growth of the 
Bolivian industry include the establishment of reasonably secure 
routes through Brazil and Colombia, with the Colombian connection 
being especially important since it facilitated expert marketing 
in North America as well as the conversion of cocaine sulphate into 
the finished article, both skills that the Bolivians only acquired 
on a useful scale in the course of late 1980 and 1981. High rates 
of profit; the abundance of high-quality coca leaf; lack of ef-
ficient control in the principal areas on cultivation (the Yungas 
region of La Paz and Chapare, Cochabamba) and even less super-
vision in the main processing centre of Santa Cruz and in the Beni 
which with its many private airstrips makes an excellent staging 
post, have contributed to the rise of an industry that by 1981 was 
the country's single largest earner of foreign exchange and the 
foundation of an entire political class, the 'narcokleptocracia'. 
It should be added that while this trade was nominally clandestine, 
both before and after July 1980 it was undertaken with remarkable 
openness and has affected the daily lives of a great many people -
virtually the entire population of Chapare, a good portion of the 
very populous Yungas, and many day labourers in Santa Cruz, where 
cocaine factories employ up to 200 workers on a shift. 
The two principal impediments to cocaine production and sale 
are that it is illegal and that, by virtue of this, it is not 
governed by the traditional rules of competition between capitals, 
tending towards Mafia-style organisation and highly erratic con-
ditions of control at every point of the production process. The 
consequences of both these factors have been amply manifest in 
Bolivia since mid-1980. 
There now exists convincing evidence that the established coca 
clans based in Santa Cruz and the Beni supported the 1980 coup once 
it was known that the UDP had won the election and understood that 
Siles would cooperate with the large DEA operation in the country 
and remove the clans' principal military protectors. It seems 
that no one sector funded the coup to ameliorate its position against 
the others but once the new regime was established the group based 
around Arce became predominant, with the minister of the interior 
occupying an optimum position to levy unofficial taxes, ensure 
protection and mediate in relations with the Colombians. Nonethe-
less, Arce was soon obliged to recognise the claims of two rela-
tively new factions - based largely around the Santa Cruz garrison 
and the airforce - to an equitable share of the proceeds. Within 
a few months of the coup many officers of all ranks were deeply 
involved in the trade at a number of levels: buying up land and 
cultivating coca directly, purchasing leaf, running factories or 
supervising transport by air or road. 
The effect was a rapid erosion of institutional norms and the 
strengthening of a parallel structure of power that was based on 
production and highly divisive in terms of competition for lucrative 
local commands (particularly in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz), 
demands on the limited availability of labour (both military and 
civilian), control of airspace and alliances with civilian commercial 
interests. Most importantly, entry into the trade opened the 
armed forces to unprecedented financial rewards that had directly 
political implications and played havoc with the traditional struc-
ture of personal ambitions. 
This ad hoc system came under external pressure from the start, 
most incisively in the campaign of the DEA and the State Department 
to isolate the regime and cultivate relations with military figures 
that were not implicated in the trade (a policy that cannot necessar-
ily be understood to have found total agreement in the Pentagon). 
It was largely as a result of this factor that from early 1981 the 
operations of the industry were tightened up and a distinctly 
unimpressive campaign to 'fight' it launched by the regime's 
Departamento de Sustancias Peligrosas, which distiinguished itself by 
raiding small independent operations and ostentatiously burning their 
produce but more frequently 'losing' the impounded cocaine. The 
record of this department confirms the impression that, aside from 
its critical repercussions on U.S. public opinion and policy and a 
number of arrests of carriers, the DEA operation did not directly 
hamper the domestic organisation of trade that was supervised by 
senior members of an independent government. More immediate pro-
blems resulted from the speed and scope of expansion, which led to 
great instability in the price of coca leaf and a corresponding 
erraticism in the incidence of planting and harvesting, upsetting 
the agricultural rhythm in the Yungas and the Chapare as well as 
the fortunes of the local peasants. 
The employment of troops to tread leaf soon proved insufficient 
for the military interests and great demands were made on the sea-
sonal labour force of Santa Cruz, which was readily attracted by 
wage rates often six times as high as those offered on the cotton 
and sugar plantations. So severe was this demand that by early 
1981 the established agro-industrial enterprises, many of which 
had subsidiary interests in cocaine, began a campaign for control, 
asserting that this factor had worsened the already grave effects 
of high fuel prices and lack of credit to reduce the area sown in 
cotton from 50,000 to 15,000 hectares in 1980/81.38 
It is likely that these considerations were also important in 
provoking a severe crisis in cocaine circles within months of the 
coup. In some respects the temporary resolution of this conflict 
mirrored that in the political sphere in that it led to a fortifi-
cation of the groups based around Banzer and those sectors of the 
military recently incorporated into the trade. The most public 
indication of this was the formation in March 1981 of the Consejo 
Nacional de Lucha Contra Narcotrafico (CNLCN), under the direction 
of Colonel Arturo Doria Medina, commander of the powerful Tarapa-
ca armoured regiment and deeply antipathetic to Arce, and Colonel 
David Fernandez, formerly chief of airforce operations and a close 
ally of Bernal whose political challenge and commercial competition 
with the Garcia-Arce bloc was picking up momentum. The CNLCN 
attempted a direct militarisation of the trade by prohibiting the 
sale of coca leaf except to the armed forces, which would fix the 
price and monopolise transport. This move undoubtedly promised to 
increase the share of the market held by the institutional clans 
and it had the effect of increasing the level of violence and in-
fighting in an occupation already overly-endowed with these features. 
Within two months the senior officers of the CNLCN were forced to 
resign in recognition of the fact that no one group could dictate 
the terms of the trade and that Arce still possessed considerable 
resources even without a formal military or political position. 
Institutional Crisis: March to September 1981 
There is insufficient space available here to treat in detail the 
various facets of the challenge faced by Garcia in mid-1981. The 
principal characteristics of this conflict were that it was constant; 
it emanated from groups involved in narcotrafico and those that were 
not and from discrete alliances of the two; it derived considerable 
impetus from Washington's boycott; and, despite the consistent 
backing of the U.S., Banzer and the leading forces in Santa Cruz, 
it failed to achieve a definitive displacement of the ruling bloc. 
The first phase revolved around Banzer's efforts to impose his 
stamp on the regime, and then - following a visit to Washington -
his decision to withdraw support from it. Yet, the importance of 
Banzer's actions did not place him in the direct leadership of all 
moves against the government; the first genuine coup attempt appears 
to have been undertaken independently. This was the rebellion on 
17 March of the senior year of the Colegio Militar - the brigadieres -
against the appointment of Arce as their commander and his use of the 
academy to train the SES, which was now estimated to have 11,000 men. 
The revolt was clearly encouraged by the broadcast in Bolivia of ex-
tracts of the CBS programme '60 Minutes', which analysed the Bolivian 
cocaine trade, directly implicated Arce in it, and was widely consid-
ered to have besmirched the honour of the army. Although the revolt 
failed to spread and was suppressed without much difficulty, the need 
to expel the entire final year of the course had important ramifica-
tions in an institution which was already badly divided and in danger 
of losing all vestige of its proclaimed professional ethics; a budget 
increase of 68% did little to improve this state of affairs. One of 
the central features of the crisis was the growing opposition to the 
SES from many field officers who resented the employment of these men 
in the staffs of influential officers in the regime (Arce; Rico Toro; 
Mercado; Gribowsky; Vildoso; Lea Plaza) and began to agitate for a 
revived institucionalismo. This current lay behind the establishment 
of a temporary alliance between the disgraced Karachipampas and some 
of the leading supporters of Banzer. 
The uprising in the Colegio opened a month of tense negotiations 
between Banzer and the regime. As these talks failed to produce 
concessions on Garcia's part, the ex-dictator carefully distanced 
himself from the government and forged an alliance with Natusch, 
who still possessed an authority in the armed forces that Banzer -
now retired - required if he was to assemble an effective front. 
By the middle of April this pact was sufficiently advanced to pro-
voke the arrest of both men although Banzer, because he lived in 
Santa Cruz, enjoyed the protection of the Eighth Division against 
the SES. 
Events accelerated in early May with a series of unexpected and 
slightly bizarre efforts to displace Garcia. The first was led 
by the notoriously unstable falangist leader Carlos Valverde, who 
undertook the capture of the Tita oil refinery by party militants 
and demanded Garcia's immediate resignation. This seems to have 
been a purely party affair since it received no backing from Banzer 
or Santa Cruz. Indeed, it was the Karachipampa leader Colonel Gary 
Prado - momentarily restored to favour as commander of the Santa 
Cruz garrison in an effort to obtain the neutrality of both forces 
opposed to the regime - who led the assault against the FSB in 
the refinery and who was the only casualty of the action in cir-
cumstances that were highly suspicious. 
Two days after this incident, El Deber, a minor cruceno daily, 
published a report that directly implicated all the members of the 
junta in a secret commercial transaction to mine and export semi-
precious stones from the Lago La Gaiba region on the Brazilian bor-
der. The contract for this operation was both illegal and highly 
remunerative for the three commanders, provoking a public outcry 
that did not subside until the last of them - Bernal - was removed 
from office in September. This issue was, according to the author's 
own account, the direct cause of two attempted coups in Cochabamba 
by the leader of the elite CITE parachute batallion, Colonel Emilio 
Lanza, known to be a follower of Banzer. Neither attempt (11 and 
25 May) was either well organised or very effective. Lanza acted 
entirely on his own initiative and without great intelligence, the 
only remarkable feature of the episode being that he was permitted 
to go free to repeat his endeavour. However, Lanza's actions had 
sufficient resonance to break the atmosphere of control that the 
regime had hitherto maintained. Banzer and Natusch were immediate-
ly exiled, but this failed to stem polarisation inside the officer 
corps, now increasingly aware of its vulnerability to the labour 
movement, which staged two one-day strikes in the second week of 
May under the direction of a reorganised COB leadership. 
In an attempt to prevent further accumulation of forces by the 
banzerista camp, identified as the principal immediate threat to 
the regime, Garcia made what was superficially an astute move in 
appointing as army commander and chief of staff, Generals Humberto 
Cayoja and Lucio Anez. Both men were clearly separate from the 
governing clique and bitterly opposed to Arce; Cayoja had falan-
gist origins and was Santa Cruz's original candidate to lead the 
1971 coup, a fact that had placed him out of favour with Banzer, 
with whom he shared many qualities. Anez was close to Paz's 
MNR and had been a supporter of Natusch in November 1979 but he 
also possessed contacts with the Karachipampas; neither man was 
directly involved in the cocaine trade. Garcia's clear intention 
was to find the middle ground in appointments that would stave off 
but not satisfy Banzer nor jeopardise the existing balance of power 
inside the cocaine clans. Instead he opened up an institutionalist 
movement that found many points of agreement with the banzeristas. 
Within two days of these posts being announced the tiny but 
persistently troublesome navy officer corps demanded the removal of 
Garcia and succeeded in displacing its own commander, Terrazas, who 
held no real power. A week later Cayoja and Anez, manifesting 
an independence and determination not expected of them, called a 
meeting of snnior commanders to decide the question of the presiden-
tial succession that had not been properly settled in July 1980, had 
been since placed in much doubt, and was due to be resolved by 
independence day - 6 August. In taking this move the new commanders 
had the support of Bernal, whose personal ambitions were now open 
knowledge but did not coincide with the plans of Cayoja and Anez. 
However, the meeting reached no firm decision, obliging the two 
challengers publicly to place Garcia's retention of the post in 
doubt and declare that the presidency could only be determined by 
election from the entire senior staff of the armed forces, to which 
the junta was answerable. Garcia himself contradicted this position 
and was soon joined by his colleagues on the junta when it became 
apparent that Cayoja and Anez were attempting a complete removal of 
the existing personnel. 
The failure of Cayoja and Anez to make a success of their coup 
of 27 June - the logical result of a month of public sparring -
was due largely to their reliance on the support of the La Paz 
garrison, whose leading officers (Doria Medina, Rico Toro, Gri-
bowsky) deserted the movement in exchange for large sums of money 
dispensed on Arce's orders. (This apparently simplistic explanation 
might be found unconvincing but it is strengthened by the later pub-
lication of the letters authorising these payments and the apparent 
lack of any other motive). The collapse of the coup, the most 
serious challenge to Garcia to date, removed much of the confusion 
as to alignments within the military; the purge that followed sig-
nalled a major house-cleaning that could only presage further con-
flict. 
The outbreak on 3 August of a considerably more serious and 
well-prepared rebellion in Santa Cruz was in every respect a logical 
occurrence. The preceding month had been marked by Garcia's at-
tempts to prolong his presidency - worth an estimated $40,000 a 
week - against the wishes of the majority of commanders who could 
not, however, find an acceptable alternative within the existing 
caucus of serving officers. CONAL had, to all intents and purposes, 
signalled its own demise by declaring that to reform the Constitution 
would be ultra vires. Santa Cruz had staged a one-day strike against 
San Buenaventura and promised further action on this score. More-
over, Natusch, Banzer, Anez and Cayoja were all actively accumulating 
military support on the basis of the regime's links with La Gaiba and 
cocaine, its economic measures, suppression of democratic rights 
(hitherto not a point of contention within the armed forces) and 
dissolution of military unity. This alliance spanned the insti-
tucionalistas and members of the established cocaine network; it 
had the tacit backing of Washington and even held secret discussions 
with the COB in an (unsuccessful) attempt to secure promises not to 
exploit the division of the military for the advantage of the 
labour movement. For a while the front also had the backing of 
the MIR which - much to the disdain of its partners in the UDP -
declared itself in favour of a 'government of national convergence', 
even if it was led by the military. Needless to say, this support 
was condemned by the regime and rapidly disowned by the rebels, 
who stood well placed to eclipse Garcia's alliance with Argentina 
and were guaranteed support from Brasilia. What the movement 
gained in political authority from Banzer and Cayoja it matched in 
the military standing of Natusch and Anez. 
Thus, when the rebellion finally broke out under the leadership 
of Natusch and Anez it had every chance of success, especially 
when Garcia relinquished the presidency within 24 hours. The 
rebels failed to win Cochabamba, Oruro and La Paz, all fortified 
with an infusion of cocadolares at the order of Garcia, acting in 
support of his appointed successors, a new junta comprising Bernal, 
General Celso Torrelio (army) and Admiral Pammo. However, the 
coup succeeded in winning the backing of all the southern, eastern 
and northern garrisons, the navy, and a large part of the airforce. 
A formidable force was gathered at Santa Cruz and for three days 
it appeared that for the first time since 1952 elements of the 
armed forces would engage each other in open combat. The rebels 
demanded a full military election of the president; restitution 
of democratic rights; an emergency economic plan; a full campaign 
against cocaine and the reincorporation of all officers who had been 
purged. Their movement was dubbed one of 'dignidad nacional'. 
The potential danger of this situation was emphasised when the 
miners declared an indefinite strike in demand for the restoration 
of democratic rights but in complete independence from the coup. 
Oil supplies from Santa Cruz to La Paz were cut and the capital 
began to run short of food. The sector that had come to power 
in July 1980 seemed doomed by a revolt that championed the cause 
of almost all the dissident strains of the previous year: the re-
gional interests of Santa Cruz, competing cocaine clans, military 
institucionalistas, Washington, and many of the parties of the right 
and the centre (including the MIR). However, the junta could still 
rely on the formidable SES, the key Altiplano garrisons and the in-
herent desire on both sides to avoid combat. In this it was able 
to use the good offices of the church, which was by now the only 
institution with any coherent national organisation or authority 
other than the COB. By urging unity and compromise, and by offer-
ing its mediation, the hierarchy efficiently defused the crisis, 
at least in the short term. However, this was only made possible 
by the ability of the junta to persuade Natusch to defect from the 
revolt just at the moment when it was at the point of taking power. 
By accepting the junta's agreement to just one point of the rebels' 
demands - reincorporation of purged officers - Natusch betrayed his 
movement and disorientated the revolt. In his declaration that 
the 'natural order of command' had been re-established, he completely 
disorientated his followers and then retired to private life, the 
object of universal derision and under considerable suspicion of 
having received substantial rewards for his act. 
Although Anez disowned Natusch, it proved impossible to hold 
the revolt together, especially since Garcia was no longer president 
and the insurgents were being offered a way out. Garcia's fall 
from office was, however, a deceit for he continued to occupy the 
official residence and remained the power behind the throne. The 
junta was heavily reliant upon the backing of the SES and promised 
no changes beyond resolving institutional disputes and respecting 
the autonomy of Santa Cruz. The result of all these manoeuvres 
was a short truce inside the military; neither the Garcia-Arce 
faction nor their opponents had won the upper hand. The continuis-
ta junta held office but was unable to wield power on its own 
authority. 
This precarious situation was made utterly untenable by the 
depth of the economic crisis. In the first half of the year 
exports had dropped 19% in value against those of 1980; the mines 
were working at less than 50% capacity, while activity in manufac-
turing, construction and the oil industry had fallen further still. 
Unemployment had risen steeply to over 30% over the previous year 
and the formal trade deficit stood at over $500 million. The banks 
held a mere $120 million in fixed-term deposits and $20 million in 
current accounts while the foreign debt stood at over $4 billion, 
$460 million of which was due for repayment by the end of the year. 
In August capital flight was running at an average of $3.5 million 
a day, the blackmarket exchange rate for the dollar rose from 25 to 
37 pesos and inflation went above 50%. Extensive contraband and 
widespread pillaging of official assets further worsened the situ-
ation. In most state enterprises employees had not been paid 
since May. There was no pretence at structural planning; the 
sole concern was to secure a further stand-by loan from the IMF, 
assure the state sufficient funds to maintain its basic apparatus, 
avoid defaulting on a string of loans and buy time to negotiate 
a medium-term solution to the crisis. 
The junta invited the IMF back and imposed very tight exchange 
and price controls, neither of which it was able to enforce. More-
over, the presence of the IMF lost its weight when it became known 
that no further loans would be sanctioned without a secure political 
resolution, which was interpreted to mean the appointment of a single 
president receiving the support of the majority of the military and 
prepared to undertake a substantial devaluation. 
Under these conditions the junta found itself very much in the 
same position as had prevailed two years before under parliamentary 
rule; it declared itself to be only an interim regime, which would 
be succeeded by a single president chosen from among the armed 
forces. This move reflected not only the pressure of the IMF, it 
was also demanded by Anez, Padilla, Banzer, CONAL and the CEPB and 
even Natusch. However, it begged more questions than it answered 
for not only was there fierce personal and inter-service rivalry 
within the junta itself but there also remained the political 
challenge from an impressive array of outside forces; the only 
clear understanding was that whoever inherited the mantle of Garcia 
would be beholden both to the IMF and to Washington's pressure for 
a graduated 'apertura' to avoid further attrition within the mili-
tary apparatus and a dangerous advance on the part of the left. 
For several days at the end of August it appeared that the 
acute conflict at the beginning of the month would be resurrected 
with even more disastrous consequences as a power struggle broke 
out between Bernal, Torrelio, and - at some remove - Anez. For 
some time Bernal was held a virtual prisoner by the Tarapaca regi-
ment while the senior service first offered the airforce the chance 
to buy 53 Belgian fighters and then used the advantage of its 
greater manpower to impose its commander as the single president. 
The designation of Torrelio was further assisted by the fact that 
although he was manifestly loyal to Garcia who had promoted him 
twice within a year, he was not openly connected with any scandal, 
either narcotrafico or La Gaiba or the importing of rotten rice 
from Pakistan. Bernal was forced by his own arm to accept this 
decision, which was met with strict reservations but no outright 
opposition by the Banzer current and the institucionalistas. At 
his inauguration Torrelio promised a clean sweep, an end to the 
cocaine trade, full reincorporation of exiled officers, and a 
government 'with the law in our hands'. This was widely assumed 
to be a feint but it was recognised that the military crisis had 
exhausted itself and that the U.S. was finally prepared to reopen 
relations, increasing the prospects of a loan and the management of 
the economic crisis. 
An End to the Crisis? 
Torrelio's rise to power saw a marked reduction of conflict inside 
the armed forces; Garcia and Arce withdrew from the forefront of 
affairs and exercised their influence less directly through Colonels 
Rico Toro, Lea Plaza and Mercado. The rebels also backed down, 
Anez and the newly active Padilla preferring to make long statements 
to the press rather than organising another coup. Even the acti-
vity of the SES, soon redenominated the DIE, was curbed somewhat. 
The influence of both Argentina and Washington was clearly visible 
in this unsettled truce, visits by General Galtieri and a senior 
State Department mission being treated with the utmost importance 
by the new regime. Conflict was certainly not erased - figures 
on both sides continued to be the subjects of terrorist actions -
but a modicum of stability was attained in the recognition that 
between May and August the military had all but destroyed itself. 
This state of affairs was also determined by the fact that 
despite Torrelio's stentorian affirmation that he would continue 
the military mandate established in July 1980, his regime was widely 
viewed to be one of transition. This soon proved to be the case 
although not as a result of any decision by the government itself, 
which attempted without skill or imagination to brake any tendency 
towards an 'apertura'. The curfew was maintained, the mines re-
mained occupied by troops, arrests continued and all calls for an 
amnesty were brusquely rejected. The ADN and MNR were represented 
in the cabinet but these parties were not able to exercise any 
substantial influence, their representatives being co-opted to 
oversee the complex negotiations with the IMF and the State 
Department. 
It was precisely this stolid greynes^ of the regime and its 
inability to take a clear initiative in rolling back the legacy 
of Garcia and Arce that provoked a major resurgence of the labour 
movement. It seems plausible to suggest that the re-(establishment 
of relations with the U.S. and the IMF, the recession of inter-
necine conflict and the continued influence of Garcia convinced 
the deeply conservative military men that ran the new government 
that no major move was necessary. The early hints that the 
institucionalistas had gained influence with their strategy of a 
mobile defence of the military's interests disappeared. However, 
when in mid-November the accumulated discontent, disappointed ex-
pectations and renewed energy of the unions came into the open, 
this strategy regained some credibility. 
Between November 1981 and February 1982 the Torrelio line of a 
complete block on reform until the armed forces were fully recovered 
was rendered inoperable by a series of strikes based in the mines and 
and centred on the Huanuni camp. These strikes (12-24 November, 
17-19 December 1981, and 8-10 February 1982) were initiated at plant 
level in defence of local union rights but they soon spread to the 
rest of the camps, provoked two hunger strikes in the main cities 
(in direct emulation of the tactic that had proved so successful 
against Banzer) and gave a lead to the COB, which was still in 
the process of establishing a full national network and freeing 
itself from the association with bureaucratism and defeat that had 
grown both before and immediately after the 1980 coup. 
At first the regime responded with an escalated military oc-
cupation of the mines and a refusal to negotiate, but when this 
led to solidarity stoppages and the decision of the Huanuni workers 
to make their action indefinite Torrelio was obliged to order a 
temporary retreat. However, it required a further two-day strike 
fully to convince the army that it would have to make genuine con-
cessions. On 19 December Torrelio began a process which he could 
not hope to control for long in announcing the recognition of an 
independent union and increased wages at Huanuni. Neither side 
was fully prepared to exploit such a situation: Torrelio came under 
increasing pressure from the Garcia group - now organised in a 
lodge known as the Aguilas Negras and headed by Rico Toro - to 
halt the 'apertura' or be overthrown; the labour movement failed 
to follow the example of Huanuni with strikes on a national scale 
and a mass campaign for an amnesty. Having failed to take advan-
tage of the moment, the mobilisation of the unions became dispersed 
and took the form of accumulating pressure rather than building an 
all-out offensive. The high profile of the still outlawed COB and 
the large turnout for the May Day march in 1982 demonstrate that 
this process is still under way even if it has not, at the time 
of writing, resulted in a qualitative reversal of the losses suf-
fered since mid-1981. The balance of forces is highly uncertain. 
On the one hand, the advances made by the working class may be 
perceived in its renewed organisational capacity, evident in the 
high incidence of strikes. These have resulted in a number of 
limited gains: the promise to respect full union autonomy by the 
end of 1982; the promise to hold elections in 1983; restitution 
of university self-government and the reinstatement of many of 
those removed after July 1980; wage increases for the miners and 
the failure to impose an overall wage freeze in the economic package 
of 5 February 1982 which led to the long-anticipated devaluation, 
of 76%. 
On the other hand, the regime has proved able to keep popular 
pressure for a full 'apertura' within limits. It has not conceded 
legitimacy to the bulk of the plant unions and has managed to delay 
recognition of the COB; in all probability these will have to be 
wrested from it by further industrial action. Equally, the govern-
ment has maintained a high level of repression and continues to 
employ the DIE widely; the killing of six demonstrators in Cocha-
bamba in March testifies to a continued hard line in this respect. 
Moreover, Torrelio has restrained dissident currents in the mili-
tary, forestalled the resurgence of the principal political for-
mations and proved able to resist granting an amnesty for over nine 
months. Most importantly, his government has succeeded in survi-
ving a substantial devaluation, rates of inflation unseen since the 
crisis of 1956 and a major scarcity of basic necessities. He has 
taken advantage of the fact that the labour movement still lacks 
a political leadership, with the revolutionary left noticeably 
replenished but still unable to regain the influence it had in the 
%0s and '60s and the reformists thoroughly discredited by the example 
of parliamentarianism. 
These factors suggest that the labour movement will in the short-
term remain sufficiently disorientated to delay an emphatic offensive 
but they do not preclude a possible rapid degeneration of the Torrelio 
strategy, provoked either by the right or by the institucionalistas 
in response to renewed mass mobilisation. Washington has perceived 
these dangers and its recognition has provided new conditions for 
the management of a measured withdrawal, but to date it has done 
little to diminish the cocaine trade. This is being conducted with 
equal energy but greater diligence than before; the power of the 
clans cannot be discounted as a major factor in future political 
encounters. The economic crisis likewise persists and worsens, the 
devaluation itself falling short of providing the IMF with sufficient 
grounds to embark on a major salvage operation. Further severe 
measures will be required and are likely to be the cause of deep 
popular discontent. The conditions for a gradual retreat on the 
part of the armed forces are far less secure than they were in 1978; 
those for a qualitative hardening of military rule are much poorer 
than they were in July 1980. 
Thus, in mid-1982 Bolivian politics stand unsteadily at a cross-
roads. The option of parliamentary democracy is badly tarnished, 
its adherents either making recourse to limited syndicalist objec-
tives, or, like the MIR, advocating a populist military regime. 
The armed forces have been equally debilitated and chastened by 
their experience; their escape from some variant of 1952 is still 
not assured. In the sense that neither the right nor the left has 
been able to impose its leadership the crisis remains. In the 
short-term a centrist regime would have sufficient political space 
but this is highly unlikely to endure since the economic crisis 
manifestly requires a radical solution. This is nothing new to 
Bolivian politics, which have been marked by a singular absence of 
authentically liberal and reformist governments. 
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Hunger strike wins amnesty and elections from 
Banzer regime. 
General Pereda takes power in coup after elec-
toral fraud. 
Nov. Pereda ousted in coup by Karachipampas and 
replaced by General Padilla. 
1979 July Stalemate between MNRA and HDP in elections; 
Walter Guevara, president of the Senate, made 
interim president. 
Nov. 1-16 Coup by Colonel Natusch; general strike and 
street battles; Lidia Gueiler, president of 
Congress, appointed interim president. 
30 25% devaluation; peasants set up road blocks; 
golpistas retain military positions after further 
'passive1 coup. 
1980 April Establishment of CONADE; COB-Armed Forces 'pact' 
to respect democracy after death of Luis Espinal 
and coup threats. 
June UDP leaders killed. 
July 10 UDP wins elections. 
17 Military rising in Trinidad spreads to rest of 
country; General Garcia leads junta with 
General Bernal and Admiral Terrazas. 
18 U.S. cuts military and economic aid, withdraws 
ambassador. 
22 CSUTCB orders road blocks. 
23 Main miners' radio stations fall. 
30 Garcia makes first of many threats to leave 
Andean Pact. 
Aug. 3 Massacre of miners in Viloco and Caracoles; 
resistance ends. 
6 UDP's Government of National Unity declared in 
clandestinity on independence day. 
12 Labour 'relacionadores' established under mili-
tary control; regional royalties from mining 
receipts reduced. 
Universities formally suspended for complete 
reorganisation. 
Argentina agrees $50 million loan and cheap 
wheat sales but refuses to buy Bolivian gas at 
high price. 
Garcia coincides with Videla on need to form 
Southern Cone pact to counter ideological in-
fluence of social democracy. 
Repayment of $160 million debt to 98 banks 
postponed until January 1981. 
IMF mission visits. 
According to Minister of the Interior Colonel 
Arce Gomez political parties are unnecessary but 
banzeristas may enter government in a personal 
capacity. 
CONAL established and 1967 Constitution declared 
to be in force. 
COB offices demolished. 
Soviet Union confirms its recognition of 
Garcia junta. 
CEPB declares its support for the Andean Pact. 
Junta of Commanders declared supreme organ of 
state. 
Minister of Finance tells bankers in Washington 
that state subsidies of consumer products will 
be stopped and urges further investment and 
loans. 
600 'relacionadores' sworn in. 
Arce declares that a new security statute, 
allowing for the death penalty, will be intro-
duced in 20 days; Church first to express 
opposition. 
Strike in Huanuni camp spreads to Siglo XX and 
Catavi, lasting a week. 
Garcia rejects rumours of differences in the 
High Command but Colonel Vargas Salinas and 
General Echeverria are removed from powerful 
posts. 
Rumours of a coup attempt by Natusch. 

















Garcia reiterates threats to withdraw from 
Andean Pact when not invited to Santa Marta 
summit; CONAL expresses substantial reserva-
tions over security law. 
Security law dropped. 
Arce visits Washington to start legal pro-
ceedings against journalists implicating him 
in cocaine dealing, leaves following State 
Department protests. 
Bolivia 'abstains' from the Andean Pact. 
Junta's declaration of intent to remove price 
subsidies leads to strikes in various La Paz 
and Cochabamba factories. 
Closure of the Catholic daily Presencia for 
the publication of a story that 'insults the 
womanhood of Santa Cruz', according to Arce. 
Economic measures freeze wages, remove subsidies 
on a wide range of basic necessities. 
Urban 48-hour general strike includes pro-
government transport workers. 
Miners embark on 48-hour strike against economic 
measures. 
Paramilitary forces kill eight leaders of MIR 
in La Paz. 
Meeting between Arce and Banzer results in no 
firm agreement. 
CEPB declares its support for the economic 
package but ANMM announces it will prejudice 
mining production, running at a loss of $39 mil-
lion per annum. 
Arce announces establishment of a Comite Civica 
Nacional (CCN). 
Comite Pro-Santa Cruz (CPSC) declares 24-hour 
regional strike in defence of its autonomy. 
Junta postpones operation of CCN in Santa Cruz 
for a month. 
Armed Forces take direct control of Departamento 
de Control de Sustancias Peligrosas. 
Cabinet reshuffle includes the removal of Arce 
and Colonel Ariel Coca (Minister of Education). 
































Banzeristas Rolon Anaya and Tamayo enter the 
cabinet with tacit approval from the ADN. 
Arce appointed Commander of the Colegio 
Militar; Natusch detained briefly on 
suspicion of plotting a coup; Banzer visits 
U.S.; Adalberto Violand (pro-Banzer) dis-
places Marcelo Perez (pro-junta) as head of 
CEPB. 
Establishment of the Comite Nacional para la 
Lucha Contra Narcotrafico (CNCN). 
CNCN prohibits free market in coca leaf, 
stipulating that the army will purchase from 
growers. 
Returning from the U.S., Banzer declares that 
the Armed Forces should consider political 
reform leading to elections. 
Revolt in Colegio Militar repressed with the 
expulsion of entire final year; Arce removed 
from post and 'temporarily' retired from the 
army; in Santa Cruz army VIII Division 'inter-
venes' SES. 
Pro-government campesino organisations issue 
propaganda attacking Banzer. 
Civilian banzeristas resign from CONAL: 
Highly publicised meeting between Banzer and 
Garcia fails to establish firm agreement. 
FSB calls for establishment of a constituent 
assembly. 
Garcia announces full return to the Andean 
Pact. 
ADN formally withdraws support from government; 
universities reopened under new academic regime. 
Natusch arrested and Banzer placed under house 
arrest for allegedly planning a coup. 
FSB, led by Carlos Valverde, capture 'Tita' 
oil refinery and demand removal of Garcia. 
FSB dislodged but C.O. of VIII Division, 
Colonel Gary Prado, is seriously wounded and 
flown out by U.S. 
El Deber of Santa Cruz denounces contraband 
in precious stones from La Gaiba and implicates 
the junta. 
1981 May 11 Rebellion of CITE batallion led by Colonel 
Emilio Lanza, Cochabamba; Natusch once again 
arrested; VIII Division prevents SES arresting 
Banzer. 
12 Banzer leaves for Buenos Aires; Brazilian 
police capture the 'Novios de la Muerte' 
neo-nazi group; MIR calls for 'Gobierno de 
Convergencia Nacional'. 
15 24-nour strike in Manaco and Said factories; 
Colonel David Fernandez implicates 'Novios de 
la Muerte' in drug smuggling but General Eden 
Castillo defends them publicly. 
18 24-hour strike in major mines. 
19 Military leaders of CNCN resign because 'unable 
effectively to do our job'. 
21 CPSC denounces junta's involvement in La Gaiba 
contract. 
25 Second rebellion by Lanza and the CITE, re-
pressed after a few hours; Castillo fired on 
pretext of involvement in Lanza's coup attempt. 
26 Generals Cayoja and Anez appointed army comman-
der and chief of staff respectively. 
28 Navy demands immediate removal of Garcia. 
29 Admiral Terrazas, navy commander, resigns from 
junta; replaced by Admiral Pammo. 
June 2 Major military crisis leads to full session of 
commanders to decide succession; Banzer 
declares Garcia alone responsible for La Gaiba. 
5 Hoy, La Paz, reports that 14 commanders vote 
against Garcia, two abstain, two support him. 
16 IMF mission visits. 
21 Arrest and wounding of Genaro Flores (CSUTCB). 
22 Natusch, exiled in Peru, calls on Cayoja to 
remove Garcia. 
27 Cayoja and Anez rebel but are betrayed and 
exiled; purge of officer corps. 
July 2 CONAL declares no new constitution to be 
drawn up. 
7 IMF withholds all new loans until political 
crisis resolved. 
1981 July 10 Garcia declares he will continue as presi-
dent after 'popular demand' at public meeting 
in La Paz. 
19 General strike in Santa Cruz against the 
junta's ratification of the San Buenaventura 
project in La Paz; 24-hour strike in Huanuni 
in demand of union rights. 
28 Bar Association denies CONAL has authority 
to reform or alter Constitution. 
Aug. 3 Anez and Natusch rebel in Santa Cruz with 
full local backing. 
4 Garcia resigns; Junta of Commanders (Bernal; 
Pammo; Torrelio) takes power; strike in 
mines. 
5 Anez rejects changes as insufficient. 
6 Church offers to mediate. 
7 Natusch meets junta and agrees to retire from 
army. 
8 Rebellion disintegrates. 
16 Arce threatens rightist counter coup unless 
junta maintains old direction. 
17 Strike in mines (until 22nd) in protest at 
killing of union leader in Siglo XX. 
24 Banzer rejects alliance with junta. 
29 Number of resignations by military members 
of CONAL. 
Sept. 1 Junta in open crisis; threat of total collapse 
in rivalry between services. 
3 Bernal backs Colonel Julio Sanjines as presi-
dent; rejected by army. 
6 Torrelio designated president; Banzer agrees 
to collaborate. 
9 SES redesignated DIE; Garcia finally leaves 
presidential house. 
16 Arce and Lanza reincorporated into the army. 
21 Cayoja retired but Anez reincorporated amidst 
open discontent in officer corps. 
1981 Sept. 24 Visit of U.S. mission headed by Gordon Summer 
and Samuel Hart. 
Oct. 5 New British ambassador presents credentials. 
12 Bernal relieved as airforce commander; threat 
of coup by Aguilas Negras. 
17 SES attempt to kidnap Anez's daughter when he 
continues to question Torrelio government. 
22 Colonel Mario Oxa arrested. 
24 CEPB calls for demilitarisation of public 
administration. 
30 Bomb attack on house of Colonel Lea Plaza. 
Nov. 1 CEPB demands liberalisation of the economy 
and privatisation of many state enterprises. 
2 Edwin Corr appointed U.S. ambassador, breaking 
15 months of diplomatic isolation. 
8 Airforce reaffirms its intention of buying 53 
Belgian fighters. 
12 Strike in Huanuni in demand of union recog-
nition: press reveals that 20 officers 
retired since Torrelio came to power. 
18 Full military occupation of Huanuni leads to 
solidarity strike in other major camps; attempt 
on life of General Aguila Teran. 
23 Women in La Paz embark on hunger strike in sup-
port of miners; textile workers strike. 
24 Miners' strike lifted with establishment of 
commission to discuss union recognition and 
wage settlement. 
Dec. 12 Government-miner commission fails to reach 
agreement. 
17 Huanuni returns to strike; spreads to major 
camps and Cochabamba factories; military 
actions lead to 1,000 people embarking on 
hunger strike. 
19 Government concedes union recognition in 
Huanuni and announces that all unions, in-
cluding the COB, will be able to operate 
within a year; strike lifted. 
1982 Jan. 7 Padilla calls for arrest of officers involved 
in La Gaiba and drug smuggling. 
26 Bomb attacks on homes of Padilla and Anez; 
coup threat from Colonel Rico Toro and ultra-
right. 
30 Press agencies announce Torrelio's resignation. 
Feb. 5 Economic package includes 76% devaluation of 
the peso. 
8 48-hour general strike called by COB followed 
nationally. 
12 Argentina gives $30 million credit. 
17 24-hour factory strike. 
19 Wage talks with miners collapse; labour 
leaders arrested. 
23 Multiple exchange rate established followed 
by further strike in main mines and factories. 
Mar. 26 Six demonstrators killed by police in 
Cochabamba; COB calls 48-hour strike which 
receives national support; Arce makes further 
coup threats. 
Apr. 6 New cabinet, with increased civilian represen-
tation. 
25 Following demands for his resignation from 
Generals Padilla and Terrazas, Torrelio 
announces elections in 1983 and promises 
amnesty but no substantive measures taken. 
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